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I. INTRODUCTION

It is taken for granted in federalism discourse that if Congress
possesses the authority to regulate an activity, its laws reign supreme
and trump conflicting state regulations on the same subject. When
Congress legalizes a private activity that has been banned by the
states, the application of the Supremacy Clause is relatively
straightforward: barring contrary congressional intent, such state
laws are unenforceable and, hence, largely immaterial in the sense
they do not affect private decisions regarding whether to engage in the
activity. 1
When Congress bans some activity that has been legalized 2 by
the states, however, both the legal status and practical import of state
law are far less obvious. Contrary to conventional wisdom, state laws
legalizing conduct banned by Congress remain in force and, in many
instances, may even constitute the de facto governing law of the land.
The survival and success of these state laws are the result of
previously overlooked constraints on Congress's preemption authority
under the Supremacy Clause as well as practical constraints on its
enforcement power. Using medical marijuana as a case study, this
Article closely examines the states' underappreciated power to legalize
activity that Congress bans.
Congress has banned marijuana outright, recognizing no
permissible medical use for the drug. Violation of the ban carries a
variety of modest-to-severe sanctions, both criminal and civil. In

1.
For a classic example, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), holding that federal law
barred state injunction blocking the navigation of vessels licensed under a federal statute. For a
more contemporary one, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008), holding that federal
law barred state common-law claims challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical device
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
2.
By legalize, I mean the government permits some private conduct to occur free of legal
sanctions, both civil and criminal. It means something more than decriminalize, which merely
removes the threat of criminal sanctions. States can legalize conduct by repealing existing
sanctions or by failing to enact sanctioning legislation in the first instance. In either case, the
legal status of state law is the same, though the former method of legalization may have more
practical impact than the latter, for reasons discussed in Part IV.B. I thank Bill Funk for
bringing the distinction to my attention.
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Gonzales v. Raich,3 the Supreme Court affirmed Congress's power to
enact the ban. In fact, it suggested that Congress's power to regulate,
and hence to proscribe, medical marijuana (among other things) was
almost unlimited. 4 The decision caused some commentators to declare
that the war over medical marijuana was over, and that the states had
clearly lost. 5 As long as Congress wanted to eradicate marijuana, the
states seemingly could do nothing to stop it.
But Raich did not stop (or even slow) state legalization
campaigns. At the time Raich was decided, when Congress's authority
was still (somewhat) doubtful, ten states had legalized medical
marijuana. 6 Since that time, however, three more states have passed
legislation legalizing the use of medical marijuana, 7 and several more
states may soon join the fray.8 The flurry of legislative activity is
puzzling: If the war on medical marijuana is truly over, why are the
states still fighting?
I argue that states retain both de jure and de facto power to
exempt medical marijuana from criminal sanctions, in spite of
Congress's uncompromising-and clearly constitutional-ban on the
drug. States may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has
not preempted-and more importantly, may not preempt-state laws
that merely permit (i.e., refuse to punish) private conduct the federal
3.
545 U.S. 1 (2005). For commentary on the Raich decision, see, for example, Ernest A.
Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the 'FederalistRevival' after Gonzales v.
Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
4.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting the Court's holding
"threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach").
5.
For example, Professor Susan Klein suggests that the Court must rein in federal power
when Congress passes a law that bans an activity (such as the use of medical marijuana) that a
minority of states allow, in order to preserve independent state norms. She reasons that without
the Court's protection, independent state norms would disappear. Susan R. Klein, IndependentNorm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1564 (2002) ("[W]hen a state chooses to
pursue an independent moral norm and makes that choice clear to its citizens ... some citizens
will engage in this behavior . . . [but if] this same behavior is criminalized federally . . . the

behavior will be chilled."). See also sources cited infra, Part II.D (reflecting common belief that
state medical marijuana laws have been preempted by the Controlled Substances Act or are
otherwise ineffectual).
6.
California (1996); Oregon (1998); Washington (1998); Alaska (1999); Maine (1999);
Colorado (2000); Hawaii (2000); Montana (2004); Nevada (2004); Vermont (2004). See generally
MARIJUANA
POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAws
(2008),
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/SBSRNOV2008.pdf html (last visited Oct.
9, 2009).

7.
Rhode Island passed its own compassionate use act in January 2006, 2005 R.I. Pub.
Laws Ch. 5, § 442; New Mexico followed suit in April 2007, 2007 N.M. Laws 210; and in fall 2008
Michigan became the thirteenth state to legalize medical marijuana, Michigan Medical
Marijuana Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.26421 (2008).
8.
Nineteen state legislatures considered proposals in 2008 to legalize medical marijuana.
MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 6, at 12-13.
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government deems objectionable. To be sure, the objectives of the state
and federal governments clearly conflict: states want some residents
to be able to use marijuana, while Congress wants total abstention.
But to say that Congress may thereby preempt state inaction (which is
what legalization amounts to, after all) would, in effect, permit
Congress to command the states to take some action-namely, to
proscribe medical marijuana. The Court's anti-commandeering rule,
however, clearly prohibits Congress from doing this.9
I develop a new framework for analyzing the boundary between
permissible preemption and prohibited commandeering-the state-ofnature benchmark. The state-of-nature benchmark eliminates much of
the confusion that has clouded disputes over state medical marijuana
laws. It suggests that as long as states go no further-and do not
actively assist marijuana users, growers, and so on-they may
continue to look the other way when their citizens defy federal law.
On a more practical level, the fact that state exemptions
remain enforceable is consequential; these states laws, in other words,
are not merely symbolic gestures. The main reason is that the federal
government lacks the resources needed to enforce its own ban
vigorously: although it commands a $2 trillion dollar (plus) budget, the
federal government is only a two-bit player when it comes to
marijuana enforcement. Only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000
marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal
authorities. 10 The states, by virtue of their greater law enforcement
resources (among other things), hold the upper hand. The federal ban
may be strict-and its penalties severe-but without the wholehearted
cooperation of state law enforcement authorities, its impact on private
behavior will remain limited. Most medical marijuana users and
suppliers can feel confident they will never be caught by the federal
government.
Even more interestingly, analysis of the medical marijuana
conflict reveals that states also have comparatively strong sway over
the private (i.e., non-legal) forces that shape our actions, such as our
personal beliefs about behavior and our social norms. Simply by
allowing their residents to use marijuana for medical purposes, the
states have arguably fostered more tolerant attitudes toward the
practice, making it seem more compassionate, less dangerous, and less
wicked, thereby removing or softening the personal and societal
9.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that Congress may not
order state legislature to enact laws). I explain why preemption sometimes constitutes
impermissible commandeering in Part IL.A, infra.
10.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED

STATES (2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
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reproach that once suppressed medical use of the drug. The expressive
power of permissive state legislation-largely ignored by the
academy-cannot easily be undone or countered by Congress. As a
result, the states may possess even more de facto power vis-&-vis
Congress than is commonly perceived.
At a minimum, this Article provides a definitive study of one of
the most important federalism disputes in a generation.11 It shows
that states have wielded far more power and influence over medical
marijuana than previously recognized. The states have not only kept
the patient breathing, so to speak, in anticipation of a day when
federal policy might change; they have, for all practical purposes,
already made medical marijuana de facto legal within their
jurisdictions. In other words, the war on medical marijuana may have
ended long before the Obama Administration began to suggest that a
partial truce should be called, 12 but it may have been the states-not
the federal government-that emerged as the victors.
More importantly, however, by shedding new light on the
struggle over medical marijuana, this Article also has much broader
relevance to our understandings of federalism and state resistance to
federal authority. Although this Article focuses on medical marijuana,
the insights generated here could be applied across a wide range of
issues pitting restrictive federal legislation against more permissive
state laws. Over the past decade, states have legalized a variety of
controversial practices that Congress has sought to proscribe or
restrict. For example, states now recognize same-sex marriages,
legalize certain abortion procedures, and allow possession of firearms
that Congress proscribes (or has sought to curtail), and several states
are proposing to allow sports gambling-an activity banned under
federal statute. 13 As the case study of medical marijuana
11. I demur on the substantive question whether marijuana should be allowed as medicine.
Marijuana's harms and benefits have been catalogued and debated extensively elsewhere. For an
excellent, unbiased review of the scientific literature on marijuana's beneficial and harmful
effects, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE,

83-136 (1999).
12. For example, in a February 2009 press conference, Attorney General Eric Holder
suggested that DEA raids of California medical marijuana dispensaries should stop. Bob Egelko,
Feds Hint No More Raids on Pot Clubs in State, S.F. CHRON., Feb., 27, 2009, at Al. He has
stopped short of claiming that the federal ban would be lifted altogether. Id. See also Solomon
Moore, Prison Term for a Seller of Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, at A18
(reporting that twenty-five federal criminal cases against medical marijuana dispensaries in
California remained pending even after Attorney General Holder suggested the federal
government would no longer target such dispensaries).
13. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003)
(recognizing state constitutional right to same-sex marriage and noting the Massachusetts
Constitution is more protective of personal freedoms than is the federal Constitution);
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demonstrates, states (generally) possess legal authority to enact
permissive legislation governing such issues, in spite of contrary
congressional policy: states are merely restoring the state of nature.
And as with medical marijuana, the ultimate outcome on such issues
may hinge more on Congress's capacity to enforce its own laws and its
ability to manage the non-legal forces that shape our behavior than on
the Supreme Court's proclamations
demarcating Congress's
substantive powers vis-&-vis the states. The Article thereby highlights
the need for courts, commentators, and lawmakers to distinguish
between (1) federal laws authorizing conduct banned by the states
(under which state power is significantly constrained), and (2) federal
laws banning conduct authorized by the states (under which states
wield considerably more power).
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides some
background on the common features of state medical marijuana laws,
including the steps (if any) that must be taken in order to qualify for
exemptions under state law. It also discusses the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA"), the congressional statute banning marijuana
for all purposes, and the conventional wisdom suggesting that the
CSA preempts or at least overshadows state laws. Part III analyzes
the legal status of state medical marijuana laws. It examines the anticommandeering rule as a key overlooked constraint on Congress's
preemption power and develops a new state-of-nature benchmark for
distinguishing between permissible preemption and impermissible
commandeering. Using this benchmark, the Article concludes that
most state medical marijuana regulations have not been (and indeed
could not be) preempted by congressional drug statutes. Part IV then
proceeds to demonstrate that state exemptions have had more impact
on private behavior than the federal ban, not only because the federal
government lacks the resources to enforce its ban rigorously, but also
because it wields less influence than do the states over the non-legal
forces that shape our behavior, including personal beliefs, moral
obligations, and social norms. Finally, Part V concludes by offering
some observations on the significance and broader relevance of the
Article.

GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (2009),

available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-OAL.pdf (reporting that only
sixteen states ban partial birth abortions outright); BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND
FIREARMS, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES - FIREARMS (28th ed. 2007) (compiling state

laws pertaining to firearms, including state laws that allow the possession and transfer of
certain machine guns proscribed by federal law). For a brief discussion of the sports gambling
issue, see infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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II. MARIJUANA LAWS

This Part discusses state and federal marijuana laws in some
detail in order to lay the necessary foundation for the analysis in Parts
III and IV. Section A surveys current state laws governing marijuana.
Though every state now bans marijuana for recreational use, thirteen
states so far have adopted exemptions legalizing use of the drug for
medical purposes. Section A discusses how these medical exemptions
work, including how states police them. Section B explores the federal
government's categorical ban on marijuana and its steadfast,
aggressive opposition to medical-use exemptions. Finally, Section C
shows that most commentators have dismissed state medical
marijuana laws as a largely symbolic, doomed-to-failure experiment,
by suggesting states lack the authority to legalize something Congress
proscribes or by suggesting that medical use of the drug will succumb
to the harsh federal ban.
A. Current State Laws
Since the 1930s, every state has banned the cultivation,
14
distribution, and possession of marijuana for non-medical purposes.
In most cases, a violation of one of these bans constitutes a criminal
offense. To be sure, a few states have decriminalized very minor
marijuana offenses (i.e., simple possession of an ounce or less) without
regard to use. 15 But it is important to recognize that marijuana
remains forbidden in such states-minor offenses continue to trigger
civil sanctions, and more serious offenses remain subject to criminal
sanctions. Thus, outside the context of recently enacted medical use
exemptions (discussed below), marijuana remains a strictly forbidden
and usually (though not always) criminal drug at the state level.
Notwithstanding the tough treatment states continue to accord
recreational marijuana, a growing number of states have recently
adopted laws legalizing marijuana for medical use. California started
the wave of reform in 1996 with the passage of Proposition 215,
14. For a contemporary survey of state marijuana laws concluding that "virtually no state
recognizes legal possession or use of any 'recreational drug' ", see NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE
LAWS 163 (Richard A. Leiter, ed., 4th ed. 2003). For more exhaustive discussions of the history of
marijuana regulation in the United States, see RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD,
II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION (2d ed. 1999); LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR,
MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1993); and DAVID MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE:
ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL (3d ed. 1999).
15. See OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHO'S REALLY IN PRISON FOR

MARIJUANA 14 (2005) (noting at the time that Colorado, Maine, Nebraska, New York, and Ohio
treat simple possession as a civil offense).
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popularly known as the Compassionate Use Act.1 6 Since then, twelve
more states have passed legislation permitting residents to possess,
use, cultivate, and (sometimes) distribute marijuana for medical
18
purposes, 17 and several more states seem poised to follow suit.
The exemptions vary, but all thirteen states apply a common
framework for determining who qualifies for them. To begin, they
specify that a prospective medical marijuana user must have a
debilitating medical condition that has been diagnosed by a physician
in the course of a bona fide medical exam. The list of qualifying
conditions typically includes cancer, glaucoma, AIDS (or HIV), and
other chronic diseases that produce symptoms like severe pain,
nausea, seizures, or persistent muscle spasms. 19
In addition to being diagnosed with a qualifying condition, all
states require a prospective user to obtain his or her physician's
recommendation to use marijuana. A recommendation is not a
prescription (for reasons explained below, this seemingly trivial
distinction does matter). To recommend marijuana, the physician need
only conclude, after considering other treatment options, that
marijuana "may benefit" the patient; 20 as it sounds, this standard
appears fairly easy to satisfy. In every state except California, the
physician's recommendation must be made in writing. 21 In California,
22
an oral recommendation is sufficient.
Ten states require prospective users (and sometimes caregivers
and suppliers) to register with the state before using (i.e., handling or
cultivating) marijuana for medical purposes. 2 3 A person who fails to
register ex ante is usually barred from claiming the medical
marijuana exemption in a subsequent criminal investigation, even if
16. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
11362.5 et seq. (2009)).
17. See supra notes 6-7.
18. See supra note 8.
19. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.070(4) (1999). The list is far from static, since most states
allow patients or doctors to petition to have new conditions added. Id. California's list is more
open-ended; it covers any condition for which marijuana may, in the opinion of the treating
physician, provide relief. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
20. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.010 (2007). A few states set a (slightly) higher
threshold for issuing a recommendation, by requiring the physician to certify that the benefits of
marijuana use outweigh the risks. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 329-122(a)(2) (Michie's
2008).
21. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.010.
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (requiring the "written or oral
recommendation or approval of a physician").
23. E.g., N.M. CODE. R. § 7.34.3.3 (2008) (noting one purpose of registration is to prevent
abuse of medical exemptions). A few states require caregivers to register separately, e.g., HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 329-123, but caregiver registration will not be discussed separately here.
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he or she could satisfy all of the other requirements of the
exemption. 24 The remaining three states-California, Maine, and
Washington-impose few formal requirements on prospective users
25
beyond obtaining the physician diagnosis and recommendation.
To register, prospective users must provide a signed form from
their physician. This form must attest that the physician has
examined the patient, diagnosed the patient with a qualifying medical
condition, and determined that marijuana might benefit the patient's
condition. 26 The patient must also provide contact information for
27
herself, her physician, and her designated caregiver.
Once the registration application has been reviewed and the
patient's eligibility confirmed, 28 the state will issue a registry
identification card for the patient and the patient's designated
caregiver. The card looks similar to a driver's license: it displays the
patient's photo, name, address, and registration number, along with
the names of the patient's physician and caregiver. 29 The registration
must be renewed periodically-every year, in most states-for a
patient to maintain eligibility for the state's exemptions.3 0 All ten
states using a registration system also require patients to report any

24. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.090(a) (2009) (registration is essential; no defense of medical
necessity without it). In a few states that seem to require registration, the requirement has not
yet been fully tested (e.g., it's not clear whether otherwise qualified patients will necessarily be
barred from asserting the defense if they failed to pre-register).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.040 (person who meets requirements under statute may
raise affirmative defense against marijuana charge); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B(5)
(2006) (same); People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 464, 482 (2002) (in order to dismiss drug
charges, defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt as to his/her qualifications under
California CUA). California has recently adopted a voluntary ID card program, under which
medical marijuana users can obtain an ID card to enable them to prove their eligibility for the
state's exemption more easily. To obtain the card, users must submit required documentation to
a county health department for review, but the program is not mandatory. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.71(f).

26. Minors must usually take additional steps in order to use marijuana for medical
purposes with the state's blessing. The minor's physician must advise him/her of the risks of
using marijuana; at least one parent (and sometimes both) must consent in writing; and a parent
must agree to serve as the minor's caregiver and supervise his/her use. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-46-103(3) (2009).
27. Id. § 50-46-103(2). Oregon even requires the patient to indicate on the form where she
will obtain her marijuana. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.309(6)(a)(D) (2007).
28. The states do not simply rubber stamp applications. New Mexico's regulations detail the
steps that registration states commonly take to screen applications. N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.3.9
(2008).
29. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-103(6) (1999).
30. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010(k) (annual renewal required); HAW. REV. ST. ANN. § 329123(b) (registration valid as long as physician certifies).
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changes that might alter their eligibility, such as a change in their
31
medical condition.
States impose some restrictions on residents who satisfy these
criteria. States limit, for example, how much marijuana each qualified
patient may lawfully possess at any given time. The limits vary, but
most states allow patients to possess between one and three ounces of
"usable" marijuana, and between six and twelve marijuana plants. 32 A
few states allow physicians to set the amount based on the patient's
needs. 33 States also bar qualified patients from using or possessing
marijuana in certain contexts, such as on public property or while
34
driving.
Medical marijuana laws provide significant legal protection for
qualified patients. Qualified patients are exempt from arrest and
prosecution for possessing, cultivating, or using marijuana. 35 They are
also exempt from every other civil sanction (e.g., forfeiture) that
normally applies under state drug laws. 36 For this reason, I claim that
states have legalized marijuana, and not merely decriminalized it.
Many states go one step further and give qualified patients the right
to recover any marijuana that has been seized by state law
enforcement agents in the course of an investigation. 37 And a few bar

31. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010(k)-(1).
32. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XIII, § 14(4)(a) (patients may possess up to two ounces of usable
marijuana and up to six plants); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-A(3) (2006) (2.5 ounces
usable marijuana and six plants); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.200(3)(b) (Michie's 2005) (patient
and caregiver may possess combined total of one ounce usable marijuana and seven marijuana
plants).
Oregon's limits are notably generous (twenty-four ounces of usable marijuana and six mature
marijuana plants). OR. REV. STAT. § 475.320(1)(a). California's legislature only recently
attempted to impose quantity restrictions on users-eight ounces of usable marijuana, six
mature plants, and twelve immature plants per person-but the restrictions have been held up
in court challenges. E.g., People v. Kelly, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 399 (Cal. App. 2d 2008) (holding
that legislated quantity limits constituted unconstitutional amendment of 1996 referendum
because the original law passed by the voters imposed none).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.010 (physician determines what constitutes a sixty-day
supply for patient); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-3 (West 2008) (ninety-day supply).
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-5(A) (barring use of marijuana in all public places, schools,
and workplaces).
35. E.g., id. § 26-2B-4(A) ("A qualified patient shall not be subject to arrest, prosecution or
penalty in any manner for the possession of or the use of marijuana if the quantity of cannabis
does not exceed an adequate supply.").
36. E.g., id. § 26-2B-4(G) ("Any property interest that is possessed, owned or used in
connection with the medical use of cannabis ... shall not be forfeited under any state or local law
....

.).

37. E.g., id. § 26-2B-4(G) ("Cannabis, paraphernalia or other property seized from a
qualified patient . . . in connection with the claimed medical use of cannabis shall be returned
immediately upon the determination . . . that the qualified patient . . . is entitled to the

protections of the [New Mexico] Compassionate Use Act.").
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landlords from terminating the lease of any person who possesses,
38
uses, or cultivates marijuana in compliance with state law.
Caregivers and physicians are also afforded some legal
protections under state laws. Most states allow designated caregivers
to legally possess, handle, and even cultivate marijuana on behalf of
qualified patients without fear of state-imposed sanctions. 39 No state
permits physicians to handle or dispense marijuana, but states do
shield physicians from being sanctioned by government or private
entities (e.g., employers and licensing boards) for recommending
40
marijuana to their patients.
Although states have adopted fairly detailed regulations
specifying who may possess and use marijuana, they have been far
more circumspect regarding how qualified patients are actually
supposed to acquire marijuana in the first instance and far more
reticent to shield marijuana suppliers from state sanctions. In the vast
majority of states, there is simply no legal way for qualified patients to
obtain usable marijuana or even the plants or seeds needed to grow
their own supply. Indeed, some states have explicitly banned the sale
of marijuana to qualified patients, 4 1 even though such patients may
clearly possess, use, and cultivate the drug themselves. Most states,
however, have simply refused or neglected to address the issue,
thereby providing no guaranteed protection from strict state drug
trafficking bans for suppliers of medical marijuana. This means that

38. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 90.396(1)(f)(B)(i) (2007). States have been somewhat reluctant to
grant patients comparable protection from adverse employment actions. Compare Ross v.
RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 205 (Cal. 2008) (California CUA doesn't protect
qualified patients from employment sanctions), with Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of
Labor and Indus., 186 P.3d 300, 308 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (Oregon law bars employer from
terminating qualified patient who uses marijuana outside of workplace). See also Vik Amar, The
California Supreme Court's Decision on Whether an Employee Can Be Fired For Testing Positive
for Off-the-Job, Doctor-Suggested Medical Use of Marijuana, FINDLAW WRIT, Feb. 1, 2008
(criticizing California court's refusal to recognize employment protection for beneficiaries of
state's medical marijuana law), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20080201.html.
39. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.090(a)(3); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-b (LexisNexis 2008);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.200(3).
These caregivers are largely unregulated; almost any adult who has not been convicted of a
serious drug offense may serve as a caregiver. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.210(5)
(caregiver must be eighteen years old with no prior drug trafficking conviction). No license is
required for the job, though some states do require caregivers to register with the state and some
limit the number of patients that each caregiver may serve. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010(d)
(each caregiver may serve only one qualified patient); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121, 123(c)
(same).
40. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030(c) (physician shall not be subjected to any sanction for
recommending marijuana); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121, 123(c) (same); WASH. REV. CODE §
69.51A.030 (same).
41. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.040(a)(3).
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qualified patients must often resort to the black market to obtain the
marijuana they are legally entitled to possess, cultivate, and use.
So far, only three states have directly addressed the supply
issue. Oregon and New Mexico authorize licensed persons to grow and
distribute marijuana to qualified patients, 42 but both states limit the
price growers can charge qualified patients and the amount of
marijuana they may produce. 43 California allows qualified patients
and their caregivers to grow marijuana collectively in so-called
cannabis cooperatives. 44 The state imposes no registration or licensing
requirements on these cooperatives, but it does bar sales to nonmembers. The state's Attorney General has also issued some non45
binding "guidelines" for how cooperatives should operate.
At least two states-New Mexico and Maine-have seriously
considered supplying marijuana directly to qualified patients through
state-run distribution centers. 46 The marijuana would be grown on
state-run farms or diverted from drug seizures made by state police.
Despite the obvious appeal of maintaining close state control over the
medical marijuana supply chain, no state has yet directly participated
in the manufacture or distribution of marijuana, and for good reason.
As explained below in Part III.C, such state distribution programs are
clearly preempted by federal law, and if they were ever executed, they
would expose state agents to federal criminal liability.

42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(F) ("A licensed producer shall not be subject to arrest,
prosecution or penalty, in any manner, for the production, possession, distribution or dispensing
of cannabis pursuant to the ... Compassionate Use Act."); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.304.
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.304 (growers may be reimbursed only for the cost of materials and
utility bills, and not their labor); id. § 475.320(c) (each grower may serve only four qualified
patients); N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.4.8 (licensed growers must be non-profit and may not provide
volume discounts); id. (licensed growers may not possess more than ninety-five plants at any
time).
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.765, subdiv. § 1(b)(3) (exempting cooperatives
that grow marijuana on behalf of qualified patients from legal sanctions).
45. See EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF
MARIJUANA GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE (2008), for a discussion of guidelines concerning marijuana
cooperatives. A few cities/counties do attempt to impose some restrictions on marijuana
cooperatives, such as limiting the number that may operate and barring use of marijuana on
premises. See AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, LOCAL CALIFORNIA DISPENSARY REGULATIONS,
http://www.safeaccessnow.org/article.php?id=3165 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) (providing links to
local ordinances).
46. Danny Hakim & Michael M. Grynbaum, Legislators Grapple Over How to Legalize
Medical Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at B5 (discussing New Mexico proposal);
Letter from Roy E. McKinney, Dir., Maine Drug Enforcement Agency, to Sen. Susan Longley and
Rep. Thomas Kane (May 1, 2001) (on file with author) (discussing Maine proposal). A few cities
have likewise considered growing marijuana for patients. San Francisco's Measure S actually
passed in 2002, but it has never been implemented.
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B. Current FederalLaw
1. Substance of the CSA
Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") in
1970. The statute regulates the manufacture, possession, and
distribution of drugs, including marijuana. 4 7 Under the CSA, drugs
are classified into one of five schedules (I-V), depending on their
medicinal value, potential for abuse, and psychological and physical
effects on the body. 48 Congress placed marijuana on Schedule I, the
most severely restricted category, based on a determination that
marijuana had no accepted medical use and a high potential for
abuse. 49 The manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana,
like other Schedule I drugs, is thus forbidden at the federal level,
though a few minor exceptions have been made and are discussed
below. 50 Drugs on Schedules II-V are progressively less tightly
controlled; for example, they may be legally prescribed for medical
51
treatment.
Only two limited exceptions to the federal ban on marijuana
have been made. The first, a compassionate use program created
under President Carter, is superficially analogous to extant state
medical use programs; it allows patients to use marijuana legally for
therapeutic purposes. The marijuana for the program is supplied by a
federally approved grow-site at the University of Mississippi (the only
federally approved grow-site in the United States). However, the
program stopped accepting new applications in 1992, and only eight
(yes, eight) patients currently receive marijuana through it. Over its
entire history, only thirty-six patients have been enrolled. 52 The
second and only other way to obtain marijuana legally under federal
law is by participating in an FDA-approved research study. But since
the federal government approves so few marijuana research projects-

47. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971).
48. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (2007).
49. Id. § 812(b)(1). To give some perspective on the seriousness of this classification,
consider some of the other notable drugs that have been placed on Schedule I-heroin, Ecstasy,
LSD, GHB, and peyote-and a few that have not--cocaine, codeine, OxyContin, and
methamphetamine (all on Schedule II). 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-12 (2008).
50. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844.
51. Id. § 829 (detailing conditions under which Schedule II-V drugs may be prescribed).
52. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 14, at 21 (discussing history of the Investigational
New Drug program); Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 705 (2000)
(discussing participation in the program).

1434

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5:1421

eleven since 2000 53-only a small fraction of the population that
currently qualifies for state exemptions could participate.
The federal government has steadfastly refused to expand legal
access to marijuana. Congress has rejected proposals to reschedule the
drug or to suspend enforcement of the CSA against people who may
use marijuana under state law. 54 Likewise, the federal Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") has denied petitions to reschedule the
drug administratively. 55 One may ask why the federal government has
made such a fuss over a drug that so many consider harmless,
particularly when used by the seriously ill. This hard-line stance
against medical marijuana stems from several firmly rooted beliefs:
that marijuana's medical benefits are at best unproven, that it harms
users and third parties, that legalizing marijuana for medical
purposes suggests the drug is safe for other uses as well, and that
marijuana grown for medical purposes would invariably be diverted
onto the black market. 56 Though the Obama Administration has
hinted it might adopt a softer approach toward the medical use of

53. See Drug Enforcement Agency, Lyle Craker: Denial of Application, 74 Fed. Reg. 2101
(Jan. 14, 2009) (noting that at any given time about 500 persons use marijuana in federally
approved studies).
54. 153 CONG. REC. H8467-02 (2007) (reporting that House rejected 262-165 an amendment
that would have barred federal law enforcement agencies from using appropriated funds against
persons using marijuana legally under state law).
55. The CSA grants the Attorney General the power to reschedule drugs; rescheduling
petitions must first pass through the DEA. 21 U.S.C. § 811; see also Alliance for Cannabis
Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying rescheduling
petition and discussing history of such efforts).
The federal courts could, in theory, create a medical marijuana exemption by
recognizing a defense of medical necessity to the CSA. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
415 (1980) (suggesting, in dicta, that courts retain power to recognize a necessity defense even
when Congress has not explicitly provided for one). The Supreme Court, however, has explicitly
foreclosed this option. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491
(2001) (concluding that terms of the statute "leave no doubt that the [medical necessity] defense
is unavailable" under the CSA, given Congress's determination that "marijuana has no medical
benefits worthy of an exception"). In any event, not every person authorized to use marijuana
under state law would necessarily be able to satisfy the common law requirements of the
necessity defense. Under the common law defense of necessity, defendant must prove that: (1) he
chose the lesser of two evils, (2) he acted to prevent imminent harm, (3) he reasonably believed
his conduct would avoid the other harm, and (4) there were no alternatives to violating the law.
Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2007).
The federal courts have likewise refused to recognize any constitutional due process
right of access to marijuana for medical treatment. Id. at 866 (concluding that the Constitution
"does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed
physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering").
56. Medical MarijuanaReferenda in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Dir., Office
of Nat'l Drug Control Policy), availableat 1997 WL 606302 (elaborating on the rationales behind
the federal government's categorical ban).
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marijuana, it remains to be seen what (if anything) it will actually do
differently. 57 In sum, it appears the categorical federal ban on
marijuana is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Anyone
who possesses, cultivates, or distributes marijuana pursuant to state
law commits a federal crime and is subject to federal sanctions.
Grading and punishment of marijuana offenses under the CSA
depend on the nature of the offense (i.e., possession versus
manufacturing and distributing), the quantity of marijuana involved,
and the offender's criminal history. Most marijuana users would be
criminally prosecuted, if at all, for simple possession under the CSA,
though they could also be considered manufacturers if they grow their
own marijuana. Simple possession of marijuana constitutes a
misdemeanor under federal law, punishable by up to one year
imprisonment and a minimum $1,000 fine plus costs. 58 Offenders with
prior drug records, however, face tougher sanctions: one prior
conviction triggers mandatory prison time of fifteen days, raises the
minimum fine to $2,500, and extends the maximum prison term to
two years; a second conviction triggers a minimum term of ninety days
imprisonment, a minimum fine of $5,000 plus costs, and a maximum
prison term of three years. 59 What is more, even minor drug
convictions can trigger harsh collateral sanctions under both state and
federal law, including loss of student financial aid and public
60
assistance.

57. See sources cited supranote 12.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). To be sure, a congressional amendment to the CSA gives federal
prosecutors the option of treating some cases of simple possession as civil rather than criminal
offenses. Id. § 844a. The civil provision, however, offers only limited reprieve. To begin, the
provision is discretionary; defendants remain at the mercy of federal prosecutors, who retain
almost unfettered discretion in deciding whether to treat simple possession as a civil or criminal
matter. See Jonathan J. Rusch, Consistency is All I Ask: An Exegesis of Section 6486 of the Antidrug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 424 (1989). It is also narrow. It
applies to the simple possession of no more than one ounce of marijuana, which is far less than
what most states permit qualified patients to have. 28 C.F.R. § 76.2(h)(6)(vi). Use of the civil
provision is also unavailable when the defendant has a prior drug conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 844a(c).
In any event, it carries an assessment which, though civil in nature, can be quite steep-up to
$10,000. Id. § 844a. And because the assessment is considered a civil sanction, the rights
inhering in criminal prosecutions do not apply. This means, for example, that the federal
government need only establish a violation of the CSA by a preponderance of the evidence, and
that the respondent is not entitled to appointed counsel if he or she cannot afford one. See 28
C.F.R. §§ 76-4-42 (detailing procedures for imposition of civil penalty). On balance, then, the civil
provision gives marijuana users little comfort.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
60.

See RICHARD GLEN BoIRE, LIFE SENTENCES: THE COLLATERAL SANCTIONS ASSOCIATED

WITH MARIJUANA OFFENSES (2007) (surveying collateral sanctions imposed by states for
marijuana convictions); see also Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress's Shadow, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1411 (2005) (discussing various collateral federal sanctions that attach to drug
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Those who cultivate or distribute marijuana face even more
severe consequences under the CSA. The manufacture, distribution, or
possession with intent to distribute any amount of marijuana
constitutes a felony, carrying a maximum sentence of five years
imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $1
million for entities. 6 1 The maximum sanctions are doubled if the
defendant has a prior felony drug conviction. 62 As quantities increase,
so do the sanctions. Cases involving more than fifty kilograms of
marijuana or more than fifty plants carry a maximum term of twenty
63
years (absent aggravating factors) and a maximum fine of $5 million.
Cases involving more than one hundred kilograms or more than one
hundred plants carry a mandatory sentence of five years
imprisonment (the maximum is life) and a maximum fine of $10
million.6 4 Lastly, cases involving massive quantities (i.e., more than
1,000 kilograms or 1,000 plants) carry a mandatory sentence of ten
years imprisonment (the maximum is life) and a maximum fine of $20
65
million.
2. Constitutionality of the CSA
The federal government categorically bans marijuana. Federal
authorities have resisted efforts to reschedule marijuana ever since
the CSA was enacted, and the federal policy on medical marijuana
seems unlikely to change dramatically anytime soon. Opponents of the
federal ban have thus sought to circumscribe Congress's constitutional
convictions, including deportation, denial of student financial aid, and loss of welfare and
housing benefits).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no
remuneration is considered simple possession under the law (a misdemeanor), but only when it
involves social sharing among friends (a very limited circumstance). Id. § 841(b)(4); United
States v. Eddy, 523 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2008). The CSA does not define what constitutes a
"small amount" for purposes of section 841(b)(4), but given that provision's explicit reference to
section 841(b)(1)(D) it clearly involves amounts less than fifty kilograms of marijuana (or fewer
than fifty plants). The question is "how much less?" Some courts have ruled that a few grams of
marijuana may be too much. E.g., United States v. Damerville, 27 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1994)
(finding that 17.2 grams is not a "small amount" in federal prison). Additionally, due to an
omission in the statutory language, the manufacture of or possession with intent to distribute
any amount of marijuana (even for or among friends) does not qualify as simple possession. See
United States v. Laakonen, 59 Fed. App'x 90, 94 (6th Cir. 2003) (possession with intent to
distribute unknown quantity of marijuana does not constitute simple possession under §
841(b)(4); § 841(b)(1)(D) sets the maximum sentence); United States v. Campbell, 317 F.3d 597,
603 (6th Cir. 2003) (possession with intent to distribute small quantity of marijuana among
friends for no remuneration does not constitute simple possession).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).
63. Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
64. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
65. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
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authority over the cultivation, distribution, and possession of
marijuana, with hopes of preserving nascent state laws that accord
medical marijuana far more favorable treatment.
Gonzales v. Raich66 seemingly presented opponents of the
federal ban their best shot at limiting congressional control over
marijuana. Raich involved a challenge to Congress's power to regulate
the non-commercial, purely intrastate production and consumption of
marijuana for medical purposes-an application of the CSA that
everyone would agree is at the outermost bounds of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority.
The case arose after DEA agents raided Diane Monson's
California home and seized her six marijuana plants. Monson and
fellow Californian Angel Raich sought a preliminary injunction in
order to block the DEA from enforcing the CSA's ban against them.
Both women had been using marijuana legally under California law
pursuant to the recommendations of their respective physicians to
treat medical conditions that were not responding to more
conventional therapies. Monson grew her own marijuana, while Raich
got hers from two caregivers. They claimed (and the Court assumed)
the marijuana they used was grown locally, using only local inputs,
and was provided to them free of charge. Invoking the Court's recent
Commerce Clause decisions in United States v. Lopez 67 and United
States v. Morrison,68 Monson and Raich argued that the local
cultivation and consumption of marijuana lacked the commercial and
interstate character seemingly required by those precedents.
In a 6-3 decision, however, the Raich Court flatly rejected the
challenge. The Court found that the non-commercial, intrastate
activities Raich and Monson sought to exempt from congressional
control were hopelessly entwined with the interstate drug trade-in
essence, Congress's dominion over the latter (which no one seriously
69
questioned) necessarily required control of the former as well.
According to the majority, "One need not have a degree in economics
to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of
marijuana.., locally cultivated for personal use... may have a
substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily
popular substance." 70 Specifically, the Court reasoned that because of
66. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
67. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
68. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 ("Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself
'commercial' ... if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.").
70. Id. at 28.
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"high demand" for the drug, some marijuana grown locally for
personal use would be diverted onto the interstate drug market,
frustrating congressional efforts to eradicate that market.7 1 Thus, in
order to preserve Congress's legitimate interest in eradicating the
larger interstate drug trade, the Court upheld application of the CSA
to the non-commercial, intrastate production and consumption of
marijuana. In short, the Court quashed whatever doubts may have
once existed about the constitutionally permissible reach of the CSA.
C. Something's Gotta Give
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a clear conflict exists
between state and federal marijuana policy. Thirteen states have
legalized marijuana when used for medical purposes. The federal
government, by contrast, has banned the drug outright, and the
Supreme Court has dispelled any doubts about the constitutionality of
that ban. Considering the federal ban, what are we to make of state
compassionate use laws? Are the states allowed to legalize something
Congress forbids? Even if so, do state laws actually matter? In Parts
III-IV below, I provide the first in-depth examination of these issues.
But for now, I review how other legal authorities have assessed state
medical marijuana laws in light of Raich and the federal ban.
Not surprisingly, post-Raich assessments of the states'
authority over medical marijuana have been mostly grim. Justice
O'Connor captured the prevailing sentiment in her Raich dissent.
Condemning the Court's refusal to grant the states any reprieve from
the federal ban, she gave a bleak appraisal of state power:
"California... has come to its own conclusion about the difficult and
sensitive question of whether marijuana should be available to relieve
severe pain and suffering. Today the Court sanctions an application of
the federal Controlled Substances Act that extinguishes that
experiment ...."72
71. Id. at 19 (noting that "high demand in the interstate market will draw [home grown]
marijuana into that market," thereby "frustrat[ing] the federal interest in eliminating
commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety").
72. Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For similar appraisals, see, for
example, GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 14, at 358 (concluding that "federal laws and
policies have strangled the medical potential of marijuana"); Klein, supra note 5, at 1563
(suggesting medical marijuana states "will never succeed" as long as they remain outliers); Ilya
Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 507, 539 (2006) (suggesting Raich has prevented states from responding to local
preferences and competing for mobile citizenry on the issue of medical marijuana); LeVay, supra
note 52, at 714 ("[U]nless medical marijuana defendants are entitled to assert a legal defense to
prosecution under federal law, . . . the will of the people in those states legalizing medical
marijuana will be frustrated."); Marcia Tiersky, Comment, Medical Marijuana: Putting the
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These grim assessments stem from serious doubts about the
legal status and practical significance of laws exempting marijuana
from state sanctions. Consider, first, questions surrounding the states'
de jure power-their power to enact and enforce such laws. Many
scholars have suggested (or simply assumed) that state medical
marijuana laws have been preempted by the CSA.7 3 Though no one
has considered the assertion at length, it seems to be based upon a
straightforward application of conflict preemption doctrine as
presently understood. 74 Caleb Nelson, one of the nation's leading
scholars of preemption, explains the doctrine as follows:
Power Where it Belongs, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) (claiming state laws are "merely
symbolic" since marijuana is "still a Schedule I drug on the federal level", and that Congress, the
DEA, or the federal courts must act if states are to have any control over the issue); NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, STATES CAN'T ALLOW MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE (June 8,2005) (suggesting Raich
"effectively brought an end to local and state efforts to reduce or relax controls over domestically
grown marijuana") (quoting Tom Heffelfinger, U.S. Attorney for District of Minnesota).
73. For the view from the academy that Congress has preempted state exemptions (or that
it could do so), see, for example, Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism
and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1759 n.61 (2005) ("The [Raich] Court found
that the Controlled Substances Act... preempted California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996.");
Robert A. Burt, Family Conflict and Family Privacy: The Constitutional Violation in Terri
Schiavo's Death, 22 CONST. COMM. 427, 454 n.67 (2005) (declaring that "Congress may use its
commerce power to preempt state laws permitting medical use of marijuana"); K.K. DuVivier,
State Ballot Initiatives in the FederalPreemptionEquation:A Medical MarijuanaCase Study, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 286-93 (2001) (arguing that state laws allowing medical marijuana
could be preempted by Congress, but suggesting that Congress had not yet expressed an intent
to do so); Michael Greenberger, Did the Founding Fathers Do "a Heckuva Job"? Constitutional
Authorization for the Use of Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 397, 419-420 (2007) (suggesting Congress could preempt state laws allowing "intrastate
commerce in the growth, distribution, and sale of marijuana for medicinal purposes"); Bradford
C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the EndangeredSpecies Act Unconstitutional?,78 U. COLO.
L. REV. 375, 459 (2007) (depicting Raich as holding that it was rational for "Congress to preempt
state regulation of medical marijuana"); Brian W. Walsh, Doing Violence to the Law: The Overfederalization of Crime, 20 FED. SENT. REP. 295, n.16 (2008) (reporting that Raich Court held
that the "federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) preempted California's so-called medical
marijuana law").
Conservative federal lawmakers evidently share this belief. E.g., "Medical" Marijuana,
Federal Drug Law and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources on the House Comm. on Gov't Reform,
107th Cong. 2 (Mar. 27, 2001) ("[E]ven strong advocates of States rights ... have to agree that
States simply cannot pass their own laws contrary to Federal law whenever they disagree with
the Federal law.") (statement of Rep. Mark Souder, Comm. Chair) available at
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107h/72258.pdf; id. at 50-51 (arguing that Congress
intended to preempt state medical marijuana laws when it enacted the CSA) (statement of Rep.
Bob Barr, Comm. Member); id. at 53 ("It is my view and many on our committee that Federal
law preempts local law on [the medical marijuana issue] by virtue of the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.") (statement of Rep. Benjamin Gilman, Comm. Member).
74. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-451(I) (1998) ("[State] initiatives, in seeking to make marijuana
available as a medicine, violate the Controlled Substances Act .. ")(emphasis added); "Medical"
Marijuana,Federal Drug Law and the Constitution'sSupremacy Clause, supra note 73, at 75-76
("[T]he supremacy clause of the Constitution makes it clear that to whatever extent Congress

1440

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5:1421

If state law purports to authorize something that federal law forbids or to penalize
something that federal law gives people an unqualified right to do, then courts would
the state rule, and the
have to choose between applying the federal rule and applying
75
Supremacy Clause requires them to apply the federal rule.

Nelson did not have medical marijuana laws in mind when he wrote
this formula, but the implication of the highlighted passage seems
abundantly clear: a state law that allows citizens to use marijuana
76
must give way to a federal law that bans the use of marijuana.
The preemption concerns must be taken seriously, given the
obvious tension between state and federal marijuana policy and the
consequences wrought by preemption. If preempted, state medical
marijuana laws would be null and void. They would remain on the
books, but they would be unenforceable-like Jim Crow laws and
other vestigial legal provisions found lurking in state codes. 77 In other
words, state bans on marijuana-all of which predate state
compassionate use laws-would once again apply to medical users;
these medical users and their suppliers would be subject to the same
state legal sanctions as recreational users, leaving them vulnerable to
harassment by state agents even if federal agents chose not to enforce
the CSA.
has exercised its legitimate powers, any inconsistent state powers are prohibited. It is hornbook
law that a State law would be held void if it would retard, impede, burden or otherwise stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
• . .")(statement of Rep. Dan Lungren, Comm. Member); Letter from Reps. Mark Souder, Bob
Barr, & Doug Ose, to Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft (May 23, 2001) (claiming that "state 'medical
marijuana' initiatives which purport to allow the manufacture, distribution or individual
possession of marijuana [are] contrary to the Controlled Substances Act [and] are clearly
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause") (on file with author).
75. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 261 (2000) (emphasis added); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1180-81 & n.10 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that
Congress may preempt state laws that "purport to require or permit conduct which would be a
violation of [a] federal statute") (emphasis added).
76. One might question whether Congress actually intended to preempt state medical
marijuana laws. See, e.g., DuVivier, supra note 73, at 286-93. Congress included an express
preemption provision in the CSA barring any "positive conflict" with the statute. 21 U.S.C. § 903.
See also infra, Part III.B (discussing Congress's preemptive intent). However, focusing on
congressional intent suggests that Congress has the power to preempt state laws, if it so chooses
(and indeed, federal lawmakers have proposed language that would unmistakably preempt state
laws). Hence, I think it is more useful to focus first on Congress's constitutional power to
preempt, for, as I argue below, that power is rather limited in the paradigm discussed in this
Article.
77. See Laura Smitherman, MarylandPrepares to Repeal a Bad Law from the Civil Rights
Era, BALT. SUN, Nov. 30, 2008, at 1B (detailing legislative efforts to formally repeal a clearly
unconstitutional Jim Crow-era law making it illegal in Maryland to receive any kind of payment
for participating in a protest against racial discrimination); New Mexico Voters Repeal Jim Crow
Era Land Law, ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 9, 2006, at A16 (reporting that New Mexico residents voted
to formally remove an unenforceable provision in the state constitution barring Asian
immigrants from owning property; also noting that Florida's constitution still contains such a
provision).
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Indeed, the enactment and implementation of state medical
marijuana laws have already been frustrated by doubts about the
states' de jure authority. The medical marijuana reform movement
was delayed in 1994 when Governor Pete Wilson refused to sign a
California Senate bill legalizing medical marijuana, claiming the
measure was preempted by federal law. 78 Since then, state officials
have refused to certify new ballot proposals seeking to legalize
marijuana for medical purposes. 79 They have vetoed, 0 advised
against,8 ' and delayed8 2 the adoption and implementation of
registration and ID card programs. And they have refused to observe
laws requiring the return of marijuana seized from qualified
patients.8 3 All these actions are due to the apprehension that state
medical marijuana laws have been preempted. What is more, federal
lawmakers have proposed amendments to the CSA that would make
Congress's intent to terminate state medical marijuana programs
unmistakable. The proposed language would preempt "any and all
laws of the States ...insofar as they may now or hereafter effectively
permit or purport to authorize the use, growing, manufacture,

distribution, or importation ...of marijuana

...

"84

To be sure, not everyone believes the CSA does-or that
Congress necessarily even could-preempt state medical marijuana
78. Veto Letter from Governor Pete Wilson to California State Senate (Sept. 30, 1994) (on
file with author) (returning Senate Bill 1364 without his signature).
79. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-085 (2004) (refusing to certify proposed amendment to the
Arkansas constitution that would have legalized marijuana for medical use, on the grounds that
the it "fails to acknowledge that federal law that Congress has declared preemptive of state law
likewise bars the medical use of marijuana .... [and that] the amendment, if enacted, might be
subject to challenge under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution").
80. Robert Gunnison, Davis Moves Away from OK of Card for Marijuana Use, S.F. CHRON.,
July 14, 1999, at All (reporting that Governor Gray Davis vetoed a voluntary medical marijuana
registry because it was "clearly in conflict with federal law") (quoting Michael Bustamante,
Governor's Press Secretary).
81. Letter From Steve Suttle and Zachary Shandler, Asst. Att'y Gens. for N.M., to Dr.
Alfredo Vigil, Cabinet Sec'y Designate, N.M. Dep't of Health (Aug. 6, 2007), availableat 2007 WL
2333160 (concluding that state employees "may be subject to federal prosecution under the
Controlled Substances Act .. .for implementation or management of the medical use marijuana
registry and identification card program"). New Mexico eventually established a registry, but not
until almost eighteen months after this legal advice was given.
82. Ed Fletcher, Issuing Medical Pot IDs on Agenda, SAC. BEE, Mar. 16, 2008, at BI
(reporting that Sacramento County supervisors voted down a county ID program, citing concerns
that the program violates federal law); Bob Egelko, California's Pot Law Upheld in Appeals
Court, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 1, 2008, at B2 (reporting that San Diego County was refusing to issue
ID cards because California's law is preempted by federal law).
83. E.g., City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court of Orange County, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355,
380-86 (2008) (discussing city's assertion that CSA preempts state law that requires police to
return marijuana to qualified patients).
84. H.R. 4802, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
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laws.8 5 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the
preemption issue,8 6 despite many claims to the contrary, 7 and some
states have carried on despite lingering doubts about their de jure
authority (though not without struggles, as just noted). The problem is
that the analysis on both sides of the preemption debate has been
largely conclusory8 8 or misguided,8 9 leaving lawmakers frustrated and
confused as they deliberate how to proceed.

85. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 6, at 9 (baldly asserting that "Raich does not
affect states' ability to pass medical marijuana laws-and it does not overturn the laws now
protecting the right of more than 71 million Americans living in [states with compassionate use
laws]"); id. at 8 ("Even though patients can be penalized by federal authorities for violating
federal marijuana laws, a state government is not required to have identical laws. Therefore, a
state may still allow its residents to possess, grow, or distribute marijuana for medical
purposes.").
86. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation,and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the
Police, 91 IOwA L. REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (observing that Raich "neither declared [the CUA]
invalid on preemption or any other grounds nor gave any indication that California officials must
assist in the enforcement of the CSA").
87. See sources cited supra note 73.
88. See sources cited supra notes 73 and 85. Those who conclude state laws are preempted
reason that states may not pass laws that conflict with federal legislation, while those who
suggest state laws remain in force argue that states aren't required to follow Congress's
approach. Both lines of reasoning contain a kernel of truth, but neither is particularly helpful in
answering the question whether, why, and to what extent, states retain authority to legalize and
regulate marijuana for medical purposes.
89. Here are just a few examples. First, the California Supreme Court has recently
declared, without explanation, that there is no conflict between a California statute requiring
police to return marijuana seized from qualified patients and the CSA, even though the CSA
plainly bars distribution of marijuana and defines distribution quite expansively. City of Garden
Grove v. Superior Court of Orange County, No. S159520, 2008 WL 794311, at *2 (Cal. Jan. 28,
2008). Second, a California appellate court found the same state law was not preempted because
the return of a small quantity of marijuana doesn't constitute a "real or meaningful threat to the
federal drug enforcement effort," even though conflict preemption analysis normally does not
include such a threshold impact requirement. City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court of Orange
County, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355, 384 (2008). Third, in an amici brief before the Raich Court, one
prominent pro-legalization organization claimed "the federal government could not preempt drug
regulation even if it wished, because the federal government possesses no general federal police
power", even though, it would seem, the federal government could not preempt state exemptions
even if it did have such a general police power. Brief of the National Organization for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws, et al., as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, at 14-16, Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), availableat 2004 WL 2336547 (emphasis added). Part III
explains more fully why, exactly, these commentators/authorities (and others) have gotten the
preemption analysis wrong.
There is a notable exception. Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski has provided a thoughtful
(and mostly correct) analysis of preemption in his concurring opinion in Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629, 645-47 (9th Cir. 2002), a case invalidating (on First Amendment grounds) the federal
policy of sanctioning doctors who recommend marijuana to their patients. In dicta, Judge
Kozinski rightly notes that preempting state exemptions for qualified patients would amount to
commandeering, because it would, in effect, compel the states to criminalize conduct. But Judge
Kozinski doesn't provide a framework for distinguishing between permissible preemption and
impermissible commandeering, and thus, for determining the precise metes and bounds of state
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Consider next the practical significance of state laws removing
state sanctions for marijuana. Do such laws actually affect private
behavior, given that citizens continue to face steep federal sanctions
for possessing, cultivating, or distributing marijuana? Generally
speaking, assessments of the states' de facto power-their ability to
change private behavior-have been more upbeat and more thoughtful
than assessments of the states' de jure power. The basic thrust of the
conventional wisdom is that the federal government does not have the
capacity to enforce the CSA against marijuana users.9 0 As a practical
matter, most people can smoke marijuana for any purpose without
having to worry much about being caught and punished by the federal
government.
Nonetheless, questions about the practical import of state laws
persist. Although the federal government has not criminally
prosecuted many medical marijuana users in the past decade, it has
aggressively targeted suppliers (e.g., the DEA has raided nearly 200
medical marijuana cooperatives in California alone), 91 their
landlords, 92 and physicians who recommend the drug to patients 93 in
order to disrupt essential components of state marijuana programs.
Though new Attorney General Eric Holder has suggested the federal
raids on cooperatives might cease, it remains to be seen if the DEA or
94
local U.S. Attorneys' offices will, in fact, back down.
More interestingly, some have suggested that the federal ban
blocks states from fostering independent, marijuana-friendly norms in
their jurisdictions. As long as the federal ban persists, so the
argument goes, social norms condemning drug use and criminal
behavior will continue to suppress use of marijuana for medical

power to legalize conduct Congress forbids. And he wrongly suggests that the anticommandeering rule would block Congress from punishing doctors for participating in state
programs, on the theory that that would make it difficult for states to apply their exemptions. Id.
at 646. In any event, it seems that Kozinski's bottom-line conclusion (though largely correct) has
not made headway-as discussed in the text above, many lawmakers and officials continue to
believe state laws are preempted.
90. Klein, supra note 5, at 1564 (noting that federal government currently has few
resources for handling marijuana cases); MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 6, at 8 (noting
how ninety-nine of one hundred marijuana offenses are currently prosecuted at the state level).
91. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 6, at S1.
92. Wyatt Buchanan, Pot Dispensaries Shut in Response to Federal Threat, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 7, 2008, at B1 (reporting that DEA had sent letter warning landlords of city's marijuana
dispensaries they faced forfeiture proceedings and possible criminal sanctions for renting
property to drug cooperatives; also noting that one-quarter of San Francisco's dispensaries had
closed in response to the letter).
93. The DEA once threatened to rescind the prescription-writing authority of physicians who
recommend marijuana. See infra Part IV.A.
94. See sources cited supra note 12.

1444

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5:1421

purposes, even if the federal ban is not rigorously enforced. 95 As one
prominent criminal law scholar reasoned, "If a seriously ill patient in
California is denied legal medicinal marijuana by contrary federal
law, he will simply suffer rather than attempt to obtain marijuana
96
through the illegal drug market."
In sum, depending on which source one consults, one might
conclude that state medical marijuana programs are (1) preempted,
and thus unenforceable, (2) enforceable but impotent, or (more rarely)
(3) unencumbered by federal law. None of the extant accounts is
satisfactory; analysis of state authority has been wanting,
inconsistent, and unconvincing. As a result, confusion has and very
well could continue to reign on medical marijuana and on other issues.
Indeed, in many respects, despite important changes to state laws and
developments in federal constitutional law, our understanding of
states' power to legalize conduct Congress forbids has not evolved
much since the 1970s and 1980s. Given the stakes involved in this
dispute and the striking parallels across many other important and
timely social issues, the time has come for closer scrutiny. It is to that
task that I now turn.
Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause authority to ban
marijuana without exception, and the Supreme Court has upheld that
power. Nonetheless, as the next two Parts explain, the CSA has only
limited influence over state lawmakers and private citizens-far less
than what is commonly assumed. The states continue to wield both de
jure and de facto power to legalize medical marijuana in the CSA's
shadow. These Parts explain why the largely gloomy prognostications
about state power over medical marijuana-among other issues-are
97
largely mistaken.

95.

Criminal law expert Susan Klein insists, for example, that
[When a state chooses to pursue an independent moral norm and makes that
choice clear to its citizens . . . some citizens will engage in this behavior. If
this same behavior is criminalized federally, however, the behavior will be
chilled. Even though federal resources for criminal prosecutions are small,
the mere threat of a federal prosecution will stop all but the most hardy from
engaging in this behavior, notwithstanding its legality on the state level.
Klein, supranote 5, at 1564 (citing social norms literature).
96. Id. at 1563.
97. Elsewhere, I expose an overlooked constraint on the states: though they wield enough
power to legalize marijuana, they may not have the ability to supervise it effectively in the
shadow of a categorical federal ban. Robert A. Mikos, Commandeering States' Secrets (2009 draft)
[hereinafter Mikos, Commandeering States' Secrets] (on file with author).
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III. DE JURE STATE POWER
In this Part, I attempt to dispel the confusion on what is an
admittedly complex issue: the legal status of state medical marijuana
laws. Contrary to many of the authorities discussed above suggesting
state laws are preempted, I argue that most provisions of state
medical marijuana laws actually survive the preemption analysisthey are legally enforceable despite the apparent conflict with federal
law. Most importantly, this is the first article to explain in detail why
Congress has not preempted-and more importantly, may not
preempt-most state medical marijuana laws. In so doing, it
highlights an important and overlooked constraint on Congress's
authority to preempt state laws that allow a behavior to go
unpunished: the anti-commandeering rule.
Section A explains how the anti-commandeering doctrine
constrains Congress's preemption power. It provides a new framework
for assessing the distinction between permissible preemption and
unconstitutional commandeering. This new state-of-nature framework
is better suited for the largely ignored paradigm analyzed in this
Article-situations in which states allow behavior Congress has
banned-than is the commonly employed action/inaction framework.
Section B briefly examines congressional intent behind the CSA and
notes how Congress itself has further limited the preemptive effect of
the CSA, meaning the statute's preemptive reach is not even as broad
as it could be, constitutionally speaking. Section C then examines the
legal status of five common provisions of state medical marijuana laws
and explains why most of the provisions remain enforceable. The
detailed case study of these varied state legal provisions helps
elaborate the state of nature theory introduced and outlined in Section
A. Section D analyzes Congress's other options for undoing state
legislation and ultimately concludes that, as a practical matter,
Congress probably could not undo state laws legalizing medical
marijuana through permissible means like conditional spending. In
short, states have strong de jure power to legalize marijuana for
medical purposes, at least for purposes of state law-far more power,
in fact, than the conventional wisdom seems to suggest.
A. Congress'sPreemptive Power
Congress's preemption power is, of course, expansive. It is
hornbook law that Congress may preempt any state law that
obstructs, contradicts, impedes, or conflicts with federal law. Indeed, it
is commonly assumed that when Congress possesses the constitutional
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authority to regulate an activity, it may preempt any state law
governing that same activity. 98 Given that there are so few limits on
Congress's substantive powers, there would seemingly be no limit to
its preemption power either. 99 Or so it is commonly thought.
Though expansive, Congress's preemption power is not, in fact,
coextensive with its substantive powers, such as its authority to
regulate interstate commerce. The preemption power is constrained by
the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering rule. That rule stipulates
that Congress may not command state legislatures to enact laws nor
order state officials to administer them.1 00 To be sure, the rule does
not limit Congress's substantive powers but rather only the means by
which Congress may pursue them. For example, Congress may
designate the sites for new radioactive waste dumps, though it may
not order state legislatures to do so, and it may require background
checks for gun purchases, though it may not order state law
enforcement officials to conduct them. All the same, the anticommandeering rule constrains Congress's power to preempt state law
in at least one increasingly important circumstance-namely, when
state law simply permits private conduct to occur-because
preemption of such a law would be tantamount to commandeering.
To see why, it is necessary to examine carefully the boundary
between commandeering and preemption. Legal scholars suggest that
boundary depends on a crucial distinction between action and
inaction. Commandeering compels state action, whereas preemption,
by contrast, compels inaction.10 1 Congressional laws blocking state

98. E.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795,
797 (1996) (describing the conventional wisdom as follows: "If Congress can legislate at all in a
given area, then it can always preempt state power in that area."); Nelson, supra note 75, at 264
("The simple fact is that if a federal statute establishes a rule, and if the Constitution gives
Congress the power to establish that rule, then the rule preempts whatever state law it
contradicts."); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
243, 286-87 (2005) ("Although the state political process enjoys constitutional protection, the
particular outputs of that process do not. From the polyphonic perspective, no state legislation is
immunized from the potentially preemptive effects of federal enactments.") (emphasis added).
99. Nelson, supra note 75, at 278 n.171 ("Even if Congress wants to displace all state law
that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of certain purposes and objectives, the
Constitution may not always give Congress the power to do so .... Given modern understandings
of Congress's enumerated powers, however, this is not much of a limitation.").
100. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 188 (1992).
101. E.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89 ("[Tlhe commandeering/preemption distinction is
most plausibly and sympathetically fleshed out in terms of (some version of) the action/inaction
distinction."); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2111 n.140 (1998) (same); Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal
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action (preemption) are permissible, whereas congressional laws
requiring state action (commandeering) are not.
Obviously, drawing the boundary between commandeering and
preemption based on an action/inaction distinction requires a clear
definition of positive action. Matt Adler and Seth Kreimer are to my
knowledge the only scholars to have proposed such a definition for use
in this circumstance. Employing a definition widely used in
philosophy, Adler and Kreimer suggest positive action connotes
physical movement, and inaction connotes immobility. 10 2 As it sounds,
this definition of action is very broad: it encompasses literally any
physical movement by state officials-e.g., when state legislators
"open their mouths or raise their hands to vote 'yea' " on legislation; or
when state law enforcement agents "raise their pens, or touch their
fingers to computer keyboards, so as to issue arrest warrants,
10 3
subpoenas, indictments, and so on."
The trouble with this broad definition of action is that it
generates arbitrary results in an important subset of cases-namely,
anytime a state must take one action (e.g., repeal a law) in order to
stop taking another (e.g., impose sanctions under that law). To
illustrate, suppose California currently has a law on the books
imposing a minimum one-year prison term for simple possession of
marijuana. Clearly, the imposition of the sanction entails positive
action by the state: state agents must investigate, arrest, charge,
prosecute, convict, and imprison offenders-all, presumably, positive
actions. Congress could not, of course, compel California to enact this
law. But suppose California is now considering repealing the law. If
positive action entails any physical movement by state officials, then
repealing an old law is indistinguishable from passing a new one; after
all, both require positive action by state officials. Legislators must say
"aye" to pass the measure, the Governor must sign the bill, and so
on.10 4 It follows that if Congress can block any positive action, it could
seemingly bar California from repealing its law even though it could
not compel California to adopt the law in the first instance. The result
10 5
is arbitrary, and I doubt anyone, including Adler and Kreimer,
Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1009-10 (1995) (same). For other useful commentary on the anticommandeering rule, see, for example, MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 83-90
(2003), and Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
102. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 101, at 92-93.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 101 n.91 (noting that repeal of a law involves positive action).
105. Oddly, though the pair's action/inaction distinction would seemingly permit Congress to
force states to maintain the status quo (because repeal of an extant statute involves positive
action), they explicitly reject as arbitrary the idea that Congress's preemption power obliges the
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thinks it accurately predicts how the Court would actually rule.
Unfortunately, however, nothing in the unadorned action/inaction
framework and expansive definition of action enables a court to avoid
the result.
If not all positive actions by the states are preemptable, we
must figure out how to distinguish the actions that are preemptable
from the ones that are not. I suggest we can do that by asking whether
the state action in question constitutes a departure from, or a return
to, the proverbial state of nature.10 6 In the state of nature, many forces
shape human behavior: endowments, preferences, norms, and so on.
Critically, however, government has no distinct influence on behavior.
Government departs from the state of nature when it engages in some
action, broadly defined, that makes a given behavior occur more or
less frequently than it would if we were to consider only the private
and social forces shaping that behavior. For example, imposing a fine
of $100 (or awarding a subsidy of $100) for doing X would decrease (or
increase) the incidence of X as compared to the state of nature. It is
the state of nature-and not action/inaction, per se-that defines the
boundary between permissible preemption and impermissible
commandeering. Namely, Congress may drive states into-or prevent
states from departing from-this state of nature (preemption), but
Congress may not drive them out of-or prevent them from returning
to-the state of nature (commandeering).
Using the state-of-nature benchmark to shield some state
action from congressional preemption closes an arbitrary loophole in
the action/inaction framework while also closely adhering to longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence. First, by examining the
consequences of positive action and not just its presence or absence,
the state-of-nature benchmark avoids the arbitrary result illustrated
above. Congress could not stop California from repealing its
sanctioning law under the benchmark even though repeal of that law
clearly entails some positive action, for the repeal merely restores the
state of nature in California-no direct state government influence on
possession of marijuana. Second, the state-of-nature benchmark
tracks an important and often overlooked feature of the Court's

state to maintain the status quo. Id. at 91-92. In some places, Adler and Kreimer's seminal
article does suggest a more limited and nuanced conception of positive action. Id. at 90
(suggesting particular concern for federal laws that oblige states to impose duties on their
citizens). But even assuming such qualifications were intended, they don't get much (if any)
attention in the piece, and so have been overlooked or forgotten by courts and scholars.
106. The concept originates, of course, in THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN. Unlike Hobbes,
however, I posit a state of nature in which government (both state and federal) exists but doesn't
act, at least on the issue at hand (here, marijuana).
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preemption jurisprudence. Namely, the Court has never held that
Congress could block states from merely allowing some private
behavior to occur, even if that behavior is forbidden by Congress. 10 7 To
be sure, the Court has found myriad state laws preempted, but only
when the states have punished or subsidized (broadly defined)
behavior Congress sought to foster or deter-i.e., only when states
departed from the state of nature. 10 8 Even field preemption, the
ultimate exercise of preemption power, only restores states to the
state of nature; it does not require them to depart from it.
Time and again, legal authorities have failed to distinguish
between state laws that punish (or subsidize) behavior and those that
merely tolerate it. This oversight has generated confusion and
mistaken conclusions about state medical marijuana laws and other
state legislation. I propose the state-of-nature benchmark as an
interpretive guide that more accurately and completely captures the
distinction between commandeering and preemption than does the
unadorned action/inaction framework. It is intended as a positive
synopsis of Supreme Court precedent and not necessarily a normative
defense of it.109 Though not a panacea, the state-of-nature benchmark
should lessen the confusion that has emerged and generate more
consistent results across cases.
Lastly, before applying the new benchmark to several concrete
legal provisions, I note that there is one important exception to the
107. Consider, for example, the Court's response to personal liberty laws passed by northern
states prior to the Civil War. These laws, inter alia,forbade state agents from taking any part in
the recapture of fugitive slaves (e.g., by jailing them). In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539
(1842), the Court seemingly approved of such laws on the theory that the states could not be
obliged to assist federal (or private) authorities in rounding up or handling fugitive slaves. Id. at
615-16 (Story, J.) ("[The Fugitive Slave Clause] does not point out any state functionaries, or any
state action, to carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to
enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of
interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties
of the national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted [sic] to them by the constitution.").
The states, however, could not obstruct federal (or private) efforts to round up fugitive slaves. Id.
at 618-19. Hence, in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858), the Supreme Court invalidated a writ
issued by a Wisconsin court that ordered a federal court to release a prisoner being held under
the Fugitive Slave Act, finding that state courts had no such authority over federal officials. For
helpful background on the battle over fugitive slaves and personal liberty laws, see MARK E.
BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (1998), and
THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH: 1780-1861
(1974).
108. The Reconstruction Amendments may create a fairly narrow exception to this rule,
because the anti-commandeering doctrine arguably does not apply to congressional legislation
passed pursuant to them. See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 101, at 119-33 (discussing the anticommandeering rule and the Reconstruction Amendments).
109. For a normative critique of the Court's commandeering/preemption distinction, see
generally Adler & Kreimer, id.
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benchmark and the alternative action/inaction framework. In
particular, Congress may require states to depart from the state of
nature and to take positive action if it imposes a similar duty on
private citizens-i.e., as long as that duty is generally applicable. 110
Thus, for example, Congress may require the states to pay their
employees the same minimum wage private employers are obligated
to pay, Congress may require states to seek the consent of citizens
before selling their private information to third parties, and Congress
may require states to maintain drug-free workplaces (and test
employees, etc.)."' All of these compel departures from the state of
nature (and positive action), but because they apply generally and not
just to the states, they are permissible under the Court's doctrine.
B. Congress's Preemptive Intent
The anti-commandeering rule, properly understood, imposes an
important and largely overlooked constraint on Congress's preemption
power. Congress may neither dislodge states from nor keep states out
of the state of nature. The state of nature thus demarcates the outer
bounds of what Congress may do. Congress, of course, can always
choose to do even less; thus, when it so desires, Congress can decline
to preempt state laws that depart from the state of nature. 112
The CSA is a case in point. The CSA preempts some but not all
state medical marijuana laws that Congress could, in theory, preempt,
i.e., all of the state laws that make proscribed drug use more common
than it would be considering only the private and social forces shaping
drug behavior. Section C delves into the CSA's impact on specific
regulations, but for now I define more abstractly the statute's
preemptive reach. Congress expressly addressed the preemption issue
in section 903 of the CSA:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of
the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal

110. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932
n.17 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-79 (1992).
111. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985)
(holding that states are not exempt from federal laws). Though the text mentions largely
uncontroversial cases, determining what constitutes a generally applicable requirement can pose
a serious challenge. See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 101, at 110-12 (discussing troubles courts
face in defining the concept).
112. The Court has generally favored interpreting federal statutes in a way that avoids
difficult questions about the outer limits of Congress's substantive powers. E.g., Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001). The emphasis
on statutory construction and constitutional avoidance may help explain why so little attention
has been paid to the constitutional limits of Congress's preemption power.
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penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between
that provision of
this subchapter and that State law so thatthe two cannot consistently
11 3
stand together.

Broadly speaking, section 903 preempts any state law that
positively conflicts with the CSA. That phrase hardly begets an easy
interpretation. However, mindful of the constitutional principles
discussed above, a positive conflict would seem to arise anytime a
state engages in, requires, or facilitates conduct or inaction that
violates the CSA. In the same way that a state law requiring X cannot
be reconciled with a federal law banning X, state laws that engage in,
require, or facilitate the possession, use, distribution, or manufacture
of drugs cannot consistently stand together with the CSA. For
example, states cannot grow marijuana for qualified patients as that
14
would be engaging in conduct the CSA expressly forbids.'
Nonetheless, though the CSA surely preempts some state
marijuana regulations, its preemptive reach is not as broad as it could
be under the anti-commandeering principles discussed above. First,
Congress has disavowed any intent to occupy the field of drug
regulation. As the Court's anti-commandeering decisions make clear,
Congress may constitutionally bar states from adopting any regulation
of marijuana whatsoever. As a practical matter, of course, doing so
would not undo medical-use exemptions; it would simply require
states to treat recreational use the same way-perfectly legal. Since
Congress has no interest in pushing states closer to full-scale
legalization, it has left them free to regulate marijuana, so long as
their regulations do not positively conflict with the CSA.
Second, though section 903 bars states from engaging in,
requiring, or facilitating conduct that violates the CSA, the CSA itself
does not proscribe all actions that conceivably contribute to drug use,
nor does it proscribe omissions that do so. Broadly speaking, there are
three ways one can violate the CSA. One is by violating its terms as a
principal-i.e., by knowingly manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing marijuana (or attempting to do so). Notably, the CSA does
not proscribe omissions; that is, it does not impose any duty to act
(generally applicable or otherwise), such as a duty to report known
violations." 5 For this reason, the CSA does not oblige states to destroy
marijuana they seize from qualified patients, as discussed below in
113. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (emphasis added).
114. See infra Part III.C.4 for a more complete discussion of this example.
115. E.g., United States v. Santana, 898 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Defendant may not
be convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine . . .merely on proof that he was a
knowing spectator [to a drug transaction].").
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Section C.5. The second way to violate the CSA is by conspiring with
one or more persons to manufacture, distribute, or possess
marijuana. 116 No overt act is necessary; only an agreement to commit
a CSA violation is required for conviction. 117 Finally, the third way to
violate the CSA is by aiding and abetting another person in
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing marijuana. 118 Under
federal law, aiding and abetting requires two basic elements: (1)
committing an overt act that assists the crime (the actus reus), and (2)
having the specific intent of facilitating the crime of another (the mens
rea). 119 This sort of violation occurs, for example, when someone gives
a drug dealer a ride to a drug transaction with the intent of
facilitating that transaction, even if the driver does not gain
financially from the crime. 120 The intent element circumscribes the
preemptive impact of the CSA by sparing some state laws that only
unintentionally facilitate CSA violations-e.g., the construction of a
public road used by drug dealers.
In sum, Congress has expressed its intention to preempt some,
but not all, of the state medical marijuana regulations that it could
preempt consistently with the anti-commandeering principles
explained above. The CSA's preemption command could be restated as
follows:
States may not take any action that constitutes a violation of the substantive provisions
of the CSA, nor may they fail to take any action required by the CSA, so long as that
action is required of private citizens and states alike.

So interpreted, the preemption rule is constitutional. A
violation of the CSA by state action would presumably constitute a
departure from the state of nature. In the case of an omission,
Congress can make the states depart from the state of nature so long
as it imposes a similar duty upon private citizens.

116. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (proscribing conspiracies and attempts to violate the CSA).
117. For a discussion of the elements of a conspiracy offense under the CSA, see Kevin Jon
Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Of Drug Conspiracies,
Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111 (1996).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.").
119. See, e.g., United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) ("The
crime of aiding and abetting requires knowledge of the illegal activity that is being aided and
abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed, and some act of helping.").
120. See United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 93-95 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.).
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C. The Legal Status of State Medical MarijuanaRegulations
Here I apply the constitutional and statutory preemption
framework developed above to determine whether state medical
marijuana regulations are preemptable, and if so whether they have
indeed been preempted. I focus on five common state medical
marijuana provisions, but the analyses could be applied to other
marijuana regulations or to laws governing other subjects as well. The
five provisions are (1) exemptions from state legal sanctions; (2) state
registration/ID programs; (3) laws shielding users, suppliers, and
physicians from private sanctions; (4) state operated marijuana
cultivation/distribution programs; and (5) laws requiring state agents
to return marijuana to patients.
1. Exemptions from State Sanctions
The core of all state medical marijuana programs are the state
laws that exempt the possession, cultivation, and distribution of
marijuana for medical purposes from state-imposed legal sanctions. In
enacting such laws, the states have clearly taken positive action,
broadly defined. In substance, however, these exemptions merely
restore the state of nature that existed until the early 1900s when
marijuana bans were first adopted. The states are doing no more than
turning a blind eye to conduct Congress forbids; by exempting that
conduct from state imposed punishment, they do not require or
necessarily even facilitate it in the relevant sense (i.e., against the
state-of-nature baseline).
So understood, the exemptions cannot be preempted. A
congressional statute purporting do so-like the one mentioned in
Part II.C-would be unconstitutional. In effect, Congress would be
ordering the state legislatures to re-criminalize medical marijuanato depart from the state of nature. 12 1 Just as Congress cannot order
states to criminalize behavior in the first instance, it cannot order
states to maintain or restore criminal prohibitions.
In fact, the suggestion that state exemptions are or even could
be preempted has troubling implications, given that the states
commonly treat many drug cases more leniently than does the federal
government, even outside the context of medical marijuana. State law
enforcement agents drop cases federal authorities would probably
prosecute if they had the resources. They expunge drug convictions
121. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639-40, 645-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (suggesting, in dicta, that preemption of state marijuana exemptions would
constitute prohibited commandeering).
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that trigger federal supplemental sanctions. And they punish
offenders less severely than would federal sentencing authorities.
None of these decisions by the states has been declared preempted,
and for good reason. 122 A ruling any other way would force states to
criminalize drugs Congress has banned, adopt mandatory prosecution
policies, raise sanctions, revise sentencing laws, and shift resources
toward marijuana cases-effectively treading on whatever values the
anti-commandeering rule seeks to promote. Under the CSA, states
remain free to proscribe or not to proscribe the same drugs that
Congress bans and to punish violations more or less sternly than does
Congress.
To be sure, private conduct has unquestionably changed as a
result of the passage of the state exemptions. For reasons explained
below, citizens almost certainly use marijuana for medical purposes
more frequently now than they did when states punished the conduct.
But this change in behavior has resulted not because the states have
departed from the state of nature, but because the states have (albeit
only partially) restored it, by removing an obstacle not found in the
state of nature-namely, the threat of state-imposed punishment for
the possession, use, and cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes.
It seems safe to suppose that in the state of nature, marijuana use
would be rampant. Thus, in lifting their sanctions, the states have not
taken positive action that can be preempted, a point that is easy to see
once that action is judged against the appropriate baseline, which is
the state of nature rather than the status quo (or the unadorned
action/inaction paradigm).
Of course, states may be changing private conduct in a more
subtle way too. By declining to punish marijuana use, especially after
banning it for so long, the states are arguably suggesting that
marijuana use is safe, beneficial, and not wicked. In doing so, states
may incidentally change people's beliefs about marijuana use-not
just from what they would be in the status quo, but from what those
beliefs would be in the state of nature without such a government
signal. If the state merely suggests that marijuana is not harmful, for
example, individuals might feel more confident about experimenting
with the drug. As a result, there may be more marijuana use and thus
more CSA violations. Indeed, state exemptions probably have had an
3
effect on public attitudes toward the drug. 12

122. See Klein, supra note 5, at 1553-54 (noting that "the Supreme Court has not stricken a
state criminal statute on preemption grounds for nearly half a century").
123. See infra Part IV.
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One could argue that by expressing something about conduct,
good or bad, exemptions represent a departure from the state of
nature and thus constitute a form of preemptable positive action. But
there must be some limit to what counts as preemptable positive
action by states, even when it results in a change in behavior from
what would otherwise exist in the state of nature. Allowing Congress
to preempt state laws merely on the basis of their perceived expressive
content and related impact on behavior would eviscerate the anticommandeering limits on Congress's preemption authority: every
state law conceivably has some expressive content and some impact on
behavior. It also raises nettlesome First Amendment concerns.
Assuming states have rights vis-d-vis Congress under the First
Amendment, to the extent that state laws perform a purely expressive
function, they arguably constitute protected speech and hence may not
be preemptable. 124 Imagine Congress ordering states not to pass any
pro-marijuana resolutions calling upon the federal government to
reconsider its ban. Of course, there are some limits to what states may
say through legislation, but those narrow limits do not apply here.
While states cannot engage in crime-facilitating speech, 125 these
exemptions do not constitute such speech. States have not explicitly
encouraged, chided, cajoled, or tricked people into using marijuana;
indeed, they have gone out of their way to warn prospective users that
they are still criminally liable under federal law.
In sum, Congress may not preempt the exemptions at the core
of state medical marijuana laws. The exemptions merely restore the
proverbial state of nature. To be sure, marijuana use has increased
following passage of these laws, but the increase is not a result of
anything the states have done. Rather, it is a result of what the states
stopped doing: punishing medical use of the drug. Arguments that the
CSA already does preempt-or that Congress even could preemptstate exemptions are mistaken. Properly understood, this is
commandeering, not preemption.
2. Registration/ID Programs
Registration/ID programs are similarly safe from preemption.
The registration/ID process described above in Part II.B is designed
largely to help state agents confirm whether a suspect in a criminal
investigation is a legitimately qualified patient entitled to assert a
124. Cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1029 n.84 (2000) (suggesting that preemption could be considered

"suppression of speech" by state government).
125. See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005).
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state exemption. State registrationllD programs do not stop federal
authorities from sanctioning registrants. They do not remove any
privately created barriers to using marijuana-i.e., barriers that exist
in the state of nature. And they do not encourage registrants' use of
marijuana. In short, they do not make marijuana use any more likely
than it would be in a state of nature free of state legal sanctions. Since
Congress cannot force states to impose legal sanctions, it cannot block
states from adopting measures like registration that help them sort
out who is exempted from sanctions-at least as long as the states do
126
no more than that.
3. Protection from Private Sanctions
State laws purporting to shield patients, caregivers, suppliers,
and physicians from sanctions imposed by private persons or groups
are on weaker footing. Some states, for example, bar private hospitals
and clinics from taking adverse action (such as denying privileges)
against any physician who recommends marijuana to a patient. Some
states also bar landlords from terminating the lease of any qualified
patient, caregiver, or supplier for possessing, using, or growing
marijuana on rental property in accordance with state law. 127 Such
protection is not, of course, found in the state of nature, where
employers and landlords are free to punish marijuana use as they
deem fit. To illustrate, suppose landlord L terminates tenant T's lease
because T, a qualified patient, is growing marijuana on the rental
property. To assert state protection from eviction, T would need to
initiate a lawsuit against L. The lawsuit would be heard, and any
remedy would be enforced by a state agent. The involvement of state
agents would constitute a clear departure from the state of nature and
would thus be preemptable.
Arguably, however, Congress has not yet sought to preempt all
state laws that protect marijuana users and suppliers from private
sanctions. Under the CSA, the question is whether such protection
aids and abets a violation of the CSA. The answer may vary by
context. In the illustration, the state law requiringL to rent property
to someone L knows will use it for growing marijuana probably does

126. In theory, of course, Congress could preempt the entire field of marijuana regulations,
thereby mooting registration programs; after all, the states would no longer need to distinguish
between medical/non-medical users because they could punish neither group. See, e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
127. See supra note 38.
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constitute aiding and abetting a violation of the CSA; 128 hence, the
state law protecting marijuana growers from eviction would be
preempted. In other situations, however, state protection laws might
not yet be preempted. It would be a stretch to say that a state aids and
abets a violation of the CSA by, for example, barring an employer from
firing one of its employees simply because the employee was using
marijuana outside of work. In this situation, a state law shielding
such employees from termination would not necessarily be preempted
by the CSA, though it might be preempted by other federal
employment or licensing laws.
4. State Cultivation/Distribution Programs
A handful of states have proposed supplying marijuana directly
to qualified patients via state-operated farms and distribution centers,
similarly to the way the federal government grows and distributes
marijuana for use in research projects and in its own compassionate
use program. The CSA, however, clearly preempts any such state
program. State cultivation and distribution of marijuana constitutes a
departure from the state of nature. Though marijuana is available in
the state of nature, the state distribution program would arguably
provide something unique-a safe, cheap, consistent, and reliable
supply of marijuana. Moreover, the CSA explicitly bars the cultivation
and distribution of marijuana, leaving little doubt that Congress
129
intended to preempt such state programs.
To be sure, the preemptive effect of the CSA has been muddied
somewhat by confusion over the meaning and significance of a
relatively obscure provision of the CSA granting immunity to state
agents who enforce state drug laws. The provision has escaped the
attention of the legal academy but has recently caught the attention of
state courts attempting to reconcile state medical marijuana laws with
the CSA. The provision, section 885(d), provides that "no civil or
criminal liability shall be imposed ...upon any duly authorized officer
of any State... who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of
any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances." 130

128. Cf. United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (upholding
aiding and abetting conviction of defendant who allowed drug conspirators to use her apartment
for drug sales, knowing they were dealing drugs, and intending to assist their enterprise); see
also Buchanan, supra note 92 (reporting that DEA has threatened landlords who rent property
to marijuana dispensaries).
129. Section 841(a) of the CSA applies to "any person", which, courts have presumed, covers
government employees as well as private citizens.
130. 21 U.S.C. § 885(d).
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On the one hand, the plain language of section 885(d), referring
as it does to any state law "relating to controlled substances," suggests
the provision would allow state officials to grow and distribute
marijuana (or any other banned drug) as long as they do so under
color of state or even municipal law-i.e., while enforcing such law. A
13 1
leading constitutional law scholar (qua advocate, not commentator),
among others, has pushed this reasoning, and so far two state courts,
including the Supreme Court of California, have adopted it, albeit in a
132
different context (the return of marijuana, discussed below).
On the other hand, this expansive interpretation of section
885(d) immunity is difficult to reconcile with the CSA's express
preemption language and congressional intent. First, granting state
police (or other state officials) immunity under section 885(d) for
distributing or manufacturing marijuana would render the express
preemption language of section 903 meaningless. As explained above,
section 903 means that states may not engage in, conspire to engage
in, nor aid and abet conduct that violates the CSA. Clearly, a state law
ordering state agents to cultivate and distribute marijuana to private
citizens creates a "positive conflict" with federal law. The law would
therefore be preempted and unenforceable, and a state agent cannot
be immune from federal prosecution under section 885(d) for enforcing
133
an unenforceable state statute.
Second, a narrower interpretation of the immunity provision
also more closely comports with Congress's purpose in conferring
immunity on law enforcement agents in the first place. The purpose of
section 885(d) immunity is readily apparent. In order to handle
narcotics legally during drug investigations, both state and federal
law enforcement agents must have immunity. Without it undercover
agents and informants could not feel secure handling narcotics in the
course of a drug sting; in theory, by handling the drugs, they could
face the same charges as the drug pushers they investigate. Yet such

131. Appellants' Reply Brief at *2-6, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 259
Fed. App'x 936 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-16466) (brief signed by Randy Barnett, among others).
132. State v. Kama, 39 P.3d 866, 868 (Or. App. 2002) (finding city police immune under
Section 885(d) for returning marijuana to qualified patient, pursuant to state law); City of
Garden Grove v. Superior Court of Orange County, 2008 WL 794311, at *1-2 (Cal. Jan. 28, 2008)
(same).
133. Cf. County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1211-12 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(rejecting claim that city ordinance could immunize city-authorized marijuana cooperative under
21 U.S.C. § 885(d); city ordinance preempted, because it conflicts with CSA), rev'd on other
grounds, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d
1068, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Breyer, J.), ("Section 885(d) cannot reasonably be read to cover
acting pursuant to a law which itself is in conflict with the Act."), rev'd in part on other grounds,
445 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2006).
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technical violations of the CSA clearly help facilitate the Act's
overriding purpose of eradicating the illicit drug trade. Hence,
granting immunity for such infractions makes perfect sense. Congress
could have relied on the good sense of U.S. Attorneys not to prosecute
such violations, but one can hardly fault Congress for wanting to
codify immunity and remove any doubts. But recognizing immunity
broader than this would generate results that seem absurd in light of
Congress's underlying purpose. 134 Whatever one thinks of the wisdom
of granting such broad immunity, it seems implausible to suppose that
Congress had anything like this in mind when it enacted section
885(d).
The CSA's clear ban on state-run farms and dispensaries
explains why states have thus far balked at supplying marijuana
directly, in spite of the obvious advantages of directly controlling the
growing and distribution of marijuana in medical use programs. A few
states and cities have proposed state/local distribution centers, but
135
none has followed through and actually implemented one.
5. State Return of Seized Marijuana
States with medical marijuana exemptions commonly require
law enforcement agents to return any marijuana that was seized from
a qualified patient in the course of a criminal investigation. Such
provisions have provoked much litigation (mostly brought by law
enforcement agents) and debate, but as yet there are no satisfactory
answers to the underlying question: Are these state laws preempted?
On the one hand, by returning marijuana state agents would
seem to take positive action that violates the CSA-namely,
distributing marijuana. As defined under the CSA, distribution simply
means to transfer drugs from one person to another; no money need be
exchanged.136 Hence, at first glance, it would seem that laws requiring
state agents to return marijuana to qualified patients are preempted
because they require state agents to violate the CSA-this clearly
poses a positive conflict with the CSA.

134. Cf. United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting immunity to
a city-authorized marijuana cooperative "contradicts the purpose of the CSA").
135. Indeed, the Maine program described above was abandoned out of concern that the
program was preempted by federal law; state officials also feared the state might lose $19 million
in federal grants and that its employees could be held criminally liable for violating federal law.
Letter from Roy E. McKinney, supra note 46.
136. E.g., United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 919 (4th Cir. 1994) (sharing drugs with
another person constitutes "distribution"; no exchange of money is required).
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On the other hand, returning seized marijuana to its original
possessor merely restores the state of nature. The quantity of
marijuana in existence and the identity of the possessor are no
different than had the state government never seized the drugs.
Viewed this way, preemption of these state laws would compel state
action and not merely block it: state agents who have seized
marijuana would now be obliged to store it, destroy it, or transfer it to
federal authorities. As discussed above, this is an obligation Congress
may not impose unless it imposes a similar obligation on private
citizens as well. And it appears Congress has not yet done so: private
schools, stadiums, airlines, and shopping malls seize drugs from time
to time, yet it appears none of these private entities is requiredto turn
the drugs over to federal authorities (though most do so anyway) as
opposed to their owner.137 Until Congress imposes a generally
applicable duty to store, destroy, or turn in seized marijuana, laws
ordering state agents to return seized marijuana to its original owners
138
are not preempted.
D. Congress's Other Options
Congress cannot compel states to abandon their exemptions or
most of the other medical marijuana provisions discussed above, but it
can try to persuade them to do so voluntarily. The anticommandeering rule permits Congress to encourage positive action it
cannot oblige states to take. When it comes to marijuana, Congress
could offer states (1) money or (2) regulatory power in return for a
promise to re-criminalize use for medical purposes. As long as the
inducement Congress offers is not coercive, it would not offend
existing anti-commandeering doctrine.
Congress has immense fiscal resources relative to the states,
and the Court has imposed few meaningful restrictions on how
Congress may employ those resources to extract conditions from the
states.1 39 It seems clear that Congress could offer the states grants in

137. It would also appear that these private entities generally lack the specific intent
required to be found guilty of aiding and abetting a CSA violation. See supra notes 118-20 and
accompanying text (discussing contours of aiding and abetting liability).
138. It is thus unnecessary to address the claim made by some state courts that 21 U.S.C. §
885(d) immunizes state agents from criminal liability for the return of marijuana. That
provision-and the problems confronting state court interpretations of it-is discussed above in
Part III.C.4.
139. In particular, the conditions must be stated unambiguously; they must bear some
relationship to how the funds will be used; and the funds offered must not be so large as to
practically compel acceptance. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987) (upholding
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return for legislation that eliminates exemptions and reinstates
categorical criminal bans on marijuana. Because the grants could, in
theory, be refused, they do not compel state action, so there would be
no commandeering problem. 140 Congress also has expansive regulatory
authority that it can promise to share in return for similar
concessions. Namely, Congress could agree to spare (i.e., not preempt)
state bans on recreational marijuana in return for the states'
14
agreement to broaden those bans to include medical marijuana. '
Unlike state exemptions, state bans on marijuana are subject to
congressional preemption because they-or more precisely, the
sanctions behind them-constitute positive action that departs from
the state of nature; after all, legal sanctions for drug use are not found
in the state of nature. In essence, Congress could threaten to preempt
all state marijuana laws (i.e., preempt the entire field) unless states
agreed to adopt laws banning marijuana categorically as Congress
does. This may seem unfair, coercive, and perhaps unsound, but the
Court has upheld conditional preemption legislation giving states
42
equally dire options.
The conventional wisdom suggests that Congress's conditional
spending and conditional preemption powers are federalism's Trojan
Horses-powers that enable Congress to sidestep jurisprudential
limits on its authority and accomplish otherwise impermissible
objectives. 43 As regards state marijuana laws, however, the threat
from Congress's conditional spending and preemption powers seems
more apparent than real. It seems implausible that Congress could
muster the votes needed to pass legislation conditioning federal grants
of money or power on the agreement of states to abandon permissive
marijuana laws. Congress has banned marijuana and that ban seems
likely to remain the official federal policy for the foreseeable future,
but the opportunity for Congress to take any further action against
federal grant that required, as condition of acceptance, that South Dakota increase its minimum
legal drinking age).
140. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-73 (1992) (distinguishing conditional
spending from commandeering).
141. Of course, Congress would be betting that no state would decline such an offer, and the
fact that most states have continued to fight their war on recreational marijuana suggests that
this is the case.
142. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1982).
143. E.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1988-89 (1995); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to do
so, 78 IND. L. J. 459, 499-504 (2003) (discussing how Congress could use conditional spending to
circumvent federalism limits); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal
Spending and the Constitution,39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987).
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medical marijuana (e.g., by passing legislation designed to repeal state
exemptions) has clearly passed. Public support for medical marijuana
exemptions has grown considerably since the CSA was originally
enacted; indeed, a strong majority of citizens-over 70 percent in most
polls-now supports medical exemptions for marijuana. 144 This
majority, though perhaps not large enough to formally repeal the
categorical ban, is large enough to block measures that would

reinforce

it.145

It also has the ear of a sympathetic President who

would likely veto any
recent proposals that
enforcement agencies
monies to federal drug

such measures. In fact, Congress has rejected
would withhold grant monies from local law
in medical marijuana states and redirect the
146
enforcement agencies instead.

In sum, the anti-commandeering rule bars Congress from
preempting state medical marijuana exemptions and accompanying
registration/ID programs. To be sure, medical use of marijuana will
surely rise once states legalize it. However, that is not because the
states have removed any privately created obstacles, such as wealth
constraints, that inhibit marijuana use-i.e., not because states have
departed from the proverbial state of nature. Some state laws,
including those involving state distribution of marijuana, may be and
have been preempted. And Congress could go a step further and
preempt both state laws requiring police to return marijuana and laws
protecting citizens from private sanctions, but for the most part it has
not yet done so. Any further action-including action to exert pressure
on states to abandon exemptions voluntarily-seems highly unlikely.
The window of opportunity may have closed already, as public support
for medical marijuana, while perhaps not yet high enough to undo the
federal ban altogether, may at least block more aggressive
congressional efforts to undo state laws. This means that most state
medical marijuana laws remain in place. Whether they matter is the
topic to be considered next.

144. In an October 2002 national opinion poll, for example, 80 percent of respondents
supported legalizing marijuana for medical uses. Time, Cable News Network, and Harris
Interactive, Oct. 23-Oct. 24, 2002, iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, University of Connecticut, availableat http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.
145. See generally, Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism,68 OHIO ST. L. J.
1669 (2007) [hereinafter Mikos, Populist Safeguards] (demonstrating that public opinion
significantly constrains the exercise of congressional power).
146. See H.R. 2086, 149 CONG. REC. H8962-02 (2002) (proposing that 5 percent of federal law
enforcement grants be diverted from local drug authorities to federal drug authorities in states
that adopt medical marijuana exemptions).
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IV. DE FACTO STATE POWER
Congress cannot force states to abandon their medical
marijuana exemptions, nor are the states likely to abandon those
exemptions voluntarily. Even so, state exemptions would amount to
little more than symbolic gestures if the intended beneficiaries were
unwilling to disobey the federal ban. Though states may eliminate
state-imposed sanctions for marijuana use and cultivation, they may
not bar the federal government from levying its own.1 47 In other
words, the discovery that states have more de jure power than
previously recognized would constitute a somewhat hollow victory for
states' rights and medical marijuana proponents, unless that de jure
power also carries practical ramifications.
At bottom, the question is which law has more sway over
private conduct: a state law legalizing that conduct or a federal law
banning it. This Part addresses that question. Section A demonstrates
that the federal government's ability to enforce its ban is very
constrained, thereby limiting its influence on private behavior (and
also diminishing the significance of Attorney General Holder's recent
suggestion that the DEA should stop targeting medical marijuana
dispensaries). The federal government has too few law enforcement
agents to handle the large number of potential targets. Simply put,
the expected sanctions for using or supplying marijuana under federal
law are too low, standing alone, to deter many prospective marijuana
users or suppliers. Section B, however, considers whether Congress
can discourage marijuana use by other means, including manipulating
preferences, morally obliging compliance with its ban, or channeling
social norms against marijuana. Once again, however, this Section
concludes that the federal influence on private behavior is quite
limited. Indeed, the impact of the federal ban may be even weaker
than Section A suggests once we consider how these other forcespossibly shaped by state law-help to enable or even foster the
behavior Congress bans.
A. Enforcement of Legal Sanctions
According to neoclassical economic theory, laws need the
backing of incentives (i.e., carrots or sticks) to change human
behavior. If the government wants to promote a certain type of
behavior, it must reward that behavior (with a subsidy). Conversely, if

147. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29-33 (2005) (state medical marijuana defense does not
bar prosecution under federal CSA).
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the government wants to curtail the behavior, it must punish the
behavior (with fines or jail time). Viewed from this perspective, the
federal ban on medical marijuana does not actually deter possession or
cultivation/distribution of the drug. Though the CSA certainly
threatens harsh sanctions, the federal government does not have the
resources to impose them frequently enough to make a meaningful
impact on proscribed behavior. 148
To begin, the federal law enforcement apparatus is small. The
federal government employs 105,000 law enforcement agents, only
about 4,400 of whom work for the DEA, the lead federal agency on
drug crimes. The remainder work for dozens of departments-FBI,
ICE, ATF, and so on-and spend only a fraction of their time handling
drug crimes. 149 All told, federal agents made 154,000 arrests in 200730,000 for all drug offenses, including 7,276 for marijuana.' 50 These
figures amount to only 1 percent of all criminal arrests, 1.6 percent of
all drug arrests, and less than 1 percent of all marijuana arrests made
in the United States that year. 15' Compared to the number of federal
law enforcement agents, the number of potential targets in the war on
marijuana is enormous. More than 14.4 million people regularly use
marijuana in the United States every year, including 4 million who
live in states that legalize medical use. 52 While only a small portion of
these users, perhaps 400,000 or so, do so legally under state law
pursuant to medical exemptions, 15 3 there is no easy way for the federal
148. See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) (explaining economic theory of optimal magnitude and probability of
sanctions).
149. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS (Aug. 17, 2009),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/enforce.htm.
150. FEDERAL JUST. STAT. RESOURCE CENTER, PERSONS ARRESTED AND BOOKED BY OFFENSE,

2007, http://fsrc.urban.org/var.cfm?ttype=one-variable&agency=USMS&db-type=ArrestsFed&
saf=IN (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
151. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 149.
152. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY ON
DRUG
USE AND HEALTH,
fig. 2.1,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k7NSDUH/2k7

results.cfm#Ch2 (reporting past-month usage of marijuana).
153. I have estimated the number of people using marijuana (legally) by extrapolating from
the number of known users in a representative registration state, Oregon. Oregon, for example,
currently has 20,307 registered users, representing approximately 0.56 percent of its population.
OREGON MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROGRAM,

STATISTICS (2009), http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/

ommp/data.shtml. Because there are roughly 71 million people living in the thirteen medical
marijuana states, there would be approximately 400,000 people currently using marijuana
legally across the country. This figure is necessarily approximate, for several reasons. On the one
hand, it could overestimate the number of total users; e.g., it's possible Oregon may have more
qualified patients (per capita) than other states, if, say, some qualified patients migrated to
Oregon to take advantage of its relatively generous health policies. On the other hand, my figure
could underestimate total users; e.g., California may have more users (per capita) than my
estimate suggests since it recognizes more qualifying conditions than does Oregon (or any other
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government to focus its scarce resources on them alone. After all, it is
not as if these medicinal users wear a sign identifying themselves as
such. Assuming it must select marijuana cases at random, the federal
government, on average, would need to pursue roughly ten marijuana
cases in the thirteen medical exemption states before coming across
just one case that a state would dismiss pursuant to a medical
exemption.
Given limited resources and a huge number of targets, the
current expected sanction for medical marijuana users is quite low.
Suppose that only 5 percent of all marijuana offenders are currently
discovered by law enforcement (state and federal combined). 154 Of that
figure, only 1 percent of offenders are handled by federal law
enforcement.155 Assuming no cooperation between the sovereigns, only
0.05 percent-or roughly 1 in 2,000-of medical marijuana users
would be uncovered by federal authorities following current practices.
Hence, even if nominal federal sanctions are set very high (as they
currently are), the expected legal sanction remains quite low. For
example, a fine of $100,000 results in an expected sanction of only $50
($100,000 * 0.0005), a price many people would be willing to pay for
access to marijuana-especially considering that many deem it a lifechanging medicine.
Not surprisingly, federal authorities have largely forsaken
criminal prosecutions of medical marijuana users 56 and have instead
sought to curb medical use of marijuana by focusing on two potential
chokepoints: physicians who recommend marijuana and growers who
supply it.
Immediately following passage of the 1996 California
Compassionate Use Act, federal drug czar Barry McCaffrey issued a
strongly worded statement outlining the federal government's strategy
to thwart the initiative.1 57 One part of that strategy was to revoke the
DEA registration of any physician who recommended marijuana to a
patient, on the grounds that recommendation of an illegal drug is
state). In spite of these concerns, however, the 400,000 number appears a reasonable
approximation.
154. The states arrest more than 800,000 persons for possession of marijuana every year;
that amounts to roughly 5 percent of all marijuana users. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
155. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
156. Only a few hundred simple possession (marijuana) cases are prosecuted by the federal
government each year. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHO'S REALLY IN PRISON

FOR MARIJUANA 9 (2005) (finding federal courts sentenced only 186 defendants for simple
possession of marijuana in 2001).
157. Administrative Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62
Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
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against the public interest. 158 Such registration is necessary to legally
prescribe, dispense, or possess any controlled substance, including
159
medications; without it, most physicians cannot practice medicine.
Not surprisingly, many physicians would be unwilling to prescribe
marijuana (or any other Schedule I substance) if doing so jeopardized
their DEA registration and exposed them to criminal sanctions for
aiding and abetting CSA violations.
The states, however, seemingly anticipated this roadblock. All
thirteen medical marijuana states require only a physician's
recommendation, and not a prescription, to use marijuana legally
under state law. To the DEA, this distinction was of no moment; it
viewed both prescribing and recommending proscribed drugs as
violations of federal law. The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed. The
court found that the DEA policy violated physicians' First Amendment
rights to speak to their patients about the pros and cons of possible
treatments. 160 The DEA policy was constitutionally problematic
because it explicitly discriminated on the basis of both the content
(marijuana) and viewpoint (pro-marijuana) of physician speech. 16 1 The
court found there was no adequate justification for the DEA policy.
According to the court, a recommendation, unlike a prescription,
entails no more than simply discussing the pros and cons of marijuana
use; it does not necessarily encourage or aid and abet marijuana
use. 16 2 The court thus issued an injunction blocking the DEA from
denying or rescinding the DEA registration of physicians who merely
recommend marijuana. Though the court's reasoning is hardly
unassailable, its decision has been followed nationally, and the DEA
no longer threatens to sanction physicians for merely recommending

158. Id. at 6164 (concluding that a practitioner's action of "recommending or prescribing
Schedule I controlled substances is not consistent with the 'public interest' . . . and will lead to
administrative action by the [DEA] to revoke the practitioner's registration") (citing 21 U.S.C. §
823(f)).
159. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639-40 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("By
speaking candidly to their patients about the potential benefits of medical marijuana,
[physicians] risk losing their license to write prescriptions, which would prevent them from
functioning as doctors. In other words, they may destroy their careers and lose their
livelihoods.").
160. Id. at 636.
161. Id. at 637 ('The government's policy in this case seeks to punish physicians on the basis
of the content of doctor-patient communications. Only doctor-patient conversations that include
discussions of the medical use of marijuana trigger the policy. Moreover, the policy ... condemns
expression of a particular viewpoint, i.e., that medical marijuana would likely help a specific
patient. Such condemnation of particular views is especially troubling in the First Amendment
context.").
162. Id. at 638 (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002)) (assuming that any
crime-facilitating speech would not be protected).
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marijuana. Thus, by carefully circumscribing the task that physicians
must perform, the states have prevented the federal government from
squeezing one of the most important chokepoints in state medical
marijuana programs.
A second federal strategy-and one not constrained by the
First Amendment-has been to target marijuana growers and
suppliers, a second potential bottleneck in state programs. As
mentioned previously, the DEA has raided nearly 200 medical
marijuana cooperatives in California alone since 1996. It has also
commenced forfeiture proceedings against landlords who knowingly
rent property to marijuana growers. Targeting suppliers as opposed to
users has two obvious advantages. First, there are far fewer of them.
Some large-scale marijuana cooperatives in California purport to serve
thousands of patients, so shutting down even one of them should, in
theory, impact thousands of users. Second, the penalties for
cultivation and distribution of marijuana are significantly higher than
for simple possession, the charge most users would face. The biggest
marijuana suppliers face possible life imprisonment and a $20 million
fine under the CSA, 16 3 meaning that expected legal sanctions will be
high even if the probability of being detected by federal law
enforcement is not.
Nonetheless, efforts to take down large marijuana suppliers
probably had only a limited impact on the supply or use of marijuana,
even before Attorney General Holder announced an apparent (though
still not enforceable) truce. 16 4 One of the main reasons these efforts
have failed is because there are no substantial barriers to entry in the
marijuana market. Marijuana can be produced in almost any climate.
Unlike other drugs, no special skills, technologies, or special inputs
are needed to cultivate the plant (or so I'm told). Indeed, one can
easily obtain advice on how to grow the drug at bookstores and via
165
various websites.
This lack of barriers implies that if the federal government
shuts down one large marijuana supplier, another one could easily
take its place. Shut down all of the large growers, and smaller

163. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
164. See JON GETTMAN, MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2006), available

at http://www.drugscience.org/Archivebcr2/MJCropReport_2006.pdf (estimating that domestic
marijuana production surged ten-fold between 1981 and 2006, in spite of ongoing federal and
state eradication campaigns; also concluding that marijuana is the largest cash crop in the
United States).
165. A search on Amazon.com, for example, turned up a litany of titles like MARIJUANA
HORTICULTURE: THE INDOOR/OUTDOOR MEDICAL GROWER'S BIBLE and GROW GREAT MARIJUANA:
AN UNCOMPLICATED GUIDE TO GROWING THE WORLD'S FINEST CANNABIS. Sheesh!
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operators could step in to satisfy demand. Shut them all down-an
expensive and extremely unlikely endeavor-and many marijuana
users would simply grow the stuff themselves. To be sure, campaigns
against large suppliers could dent the supply of marijuana and
perhaps its use in the short-run. However, as long as demand for the
drug remains high, 166 federal eradication campaigns may simply push
marijuana production into smaller operations that are harder to
detect, more costly to prosecute given their sheer numbers, and
subject to lower sanctions under the CSA. 167 Simply put, without a
substantial increase in federal law enforcement resources, the
campaign against marijuana growers would likely be futile. Moreover,
such a campaign may have an unintended and deleterious
consequence: to the extent users turn to smaller (and more numerous)
suppliers or simply grow the drug themselves, the federal campaign
168
would frustrate state efforts to supervise the supply of marijuana.
Apart from dramatically increasing the federal law
enforcement budget, Congress has few options for giving the CSA
some bite. It could, in theory, empower private citizens to enforce the
ban similar to how private plaintiffs enforce Title VII bans on
employment discrimination, but such a proposal seems unlikely to
succeed.1 69 Likewise, states probably have enough law enforcement
resources to deter medical marijuana-they already handle one
hundred times as many marijuana cases as the federal governmentbut state law enforcement agents are under no obligation to help
Congress enforce its laws. Just as Congress may not commandeer
state legislatures to ban medical marijuana, it may not compel state
officers to help Congress enforce its own ban either.170 Hence,
166. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2009, at 18-19 (2008),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31l/31379/31379p.pdf (suggesting high-profit margins
for the drug have triggered large increases in indoor-marijuana production in the United States).
167. In a similar vein, federal drug authorities have warned that campaigns to eradicate
marijuana grown outdoors may have simply pushed marijuana production indoors where it is
harder to detect. Id.
168. As I discuss in Mikos, Commandeering States' Secrets, supra note 97, such supervision
is needed to prevent diversion of marijuana to recreational uses and to protect the health of
legitimate medical users.
169. Title VII creates a private cause of action against employers who discriminate, thereby
lessening the need for federal agencies to enforce the law. Creating a private cause of action
(criminal or civil) against persons who grow (or use) marijuana, however, may not work nearly as
effectively (assuming Congress could pass such a measure in the first place). To begin, citizens
may not have a strong enough incentive to sue drug users/suppliers (it's considered a victimless
crime), though offering them a share of any forfeited property could serve as an inducement. In
any event, even assuming they are motivated to act, private citizens don't necessarily have the
information necessary to take action (unlike direct victims of employment discrimination)many people who use/grow marijuana do so in private.
170. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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deterring the use or supply of marijuana, even in just thirteen states,
through legal sanctions would require a dramatic increase in the
federal criminal caseload and a corresponding increase in federal law
enforcement staffing levels. This is a highly unlikely scenario.
B. Beyond Legal Sanctions-Why People Obey Law
At this point, a neoclassical economist would probably surmise
that the federal ban does not significantly reduce the use or supply of
marijuana because the expected legal sanctions for disobeying the ban
are, for many people, outweighed by the expected benefits of
disobedience. Contrary to this prediction, however, people often do
obey the law, even when they do not expect to be punished by the
government for non-compliance-i.e., even when they lack strong legal
incentives to obey. This paradox suggests that law can affect behavior
without granting formal legal rewards or imposing formal legal
sanctions. Of course, these incentives help, but lawmakers do not
necessarily need them to secure compliance with their edicts. The
realization that people obey laws even when they do not face high
expected legal sanctions suggests that the categorical congressional
ban on marijuana could curb marijuana use even if it is seldom
enforced; in other words, the states' de facto power may depend on
more than just the federal government's enforcement resources.
In this Section, I consider three means, apart from imposing
legal sanctions, by which lawmakers can curtail proscribed behaviors:
reshaping internal preferences, invoking moral obligations, and
publicizing social norms. To the extent Congress is able to wield these
behavior-shaping forces, it may have more de facto power than the
previous Section would suggest. Conversely, to the extent the states
are able to wield these forces and thereby foster-or at least enablebehavior that contravenes federal bans, they may have even more de
facto power than a narrow focus on law enforcement resources alone
would suggest.
1. Internal Preferences
Some people refrain from proscribed behavior not because they
fear being punished, but because they simply do not want to engage in
it. Marijuana use is an obvious example. Some people may refrain
from using marijuana because they deem it ineffectual, dangerous, or
depraved. Though they have not actually been deterred by legal
sanctions, these people act as though they had.
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Though it is commonly assumed that our preferences to engage
in or refrain from a given behavior are exogenous to law, lawmakers
arguably can change people's views of a given behavior, and thus their
inclination to engage in that behavior. 171 One way lawmakers can do
this is by passing laws that ban and therefore condemn the behavior.
The theory is that the behavior-like the use of marijuana-will seem
more dangerous or depraved if the law formally condemns it. A second
way lawmakers can shape preferences is by "educating" (or more
pejoratively, indoctrinating) the public. The federal government has,
in fact, employed this strategy in its war on marijuana. Since 1998,
the Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP") has spent more
than $1.5 billion on an aggressive ad campaign designed to discourage
marijuana use-medical or otherwise-particularly among youth,
largely by portraying the drug as dangerous, wicked, and uncool. 172 To
the extent lawmakers can shape preferences and redefine self-interest,
they can diminish citizens' desire to engage in prohibited activity
173
without having to impose costly legal sanctions.
The federal government's campaign against marijuana,
however, appears not to have altered public perceptions of marijuana
use. Studies have shown that the anti-marijuana campaign has not
reduced the likelihood of marijuana use, nor has it changed public
attitudes toward the drug. 174 People do, of course, refrain from using
171. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-3; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 944-50 (1995) (suggesting governments do/may influence

public opinion).
172. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ONDCP MEDIA CAMPAIGN: CONTRACTOR'S NATIONAL
EVALUATION DID NOT FIND THAT THE YOUTH ANTI-DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN WAS EFFECTIVE IN

REDUCING YOUTH DRUG USE 10 (2006), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06818.pdf.
173. Cf. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) ("The most important normative

influence on compliance with the law is the person's assessment that following the law accords
with his or her sense of right and wrong.").
174. ONDCP MEDIA CAMPAIGN, supra note 172 (finding "exposure to the [anti-marijuana]
advertisements [from 2002-2004] generally did not lead youth to disapprove of using drugs and
may have promoted perceptions among exposed youth that others' drug use was normal" and
"exposure to the campaign did not prevent initiation of marijuana use and had no effect on
curtailing current users' marijuana use"). Results of other studies have been mixed. Some
studies suggest government campaigns backfire. E.g., Maria Czyzewsk & Harvey J. Ginsburg,
Explicit and Implicit Effects of Anti-marijuana and Anti-tobacco TV Advertisements, 32
ADDICTIVE BEH. 114, 122 (2006) (finding that "a sample of anti-marijuana public statement
announcements used in national anti-drug campaign in the U.S. produced immediate effects
opposite to intended by creators of this campaign on the youth's attitudes to marijuana"). Other
studies suggest the campaigns do, in fact, reduce marijuana use, at least when combined with
other anti-drug programs. E.g., Douglas Longshore et al., National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign and School-Based Drug Prevention: Evidence for a Synergistic Effect in ALERT Plus,
31 ADDICTIVE BEH. 496, 498 (2006) (finding that exposure to national anti-marijuana campaign
and school-based drug curriculum significantly reduced past-month use of marijuana).
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marijuana because they believe it is ineffectual, dangerous, or wicked,
but those beliefs appear not to have been changed or reinforced by the
ONDCP's aggressive anti-marijuana campaigns.
The reason the federal government's campaign is not shaping
preferences may be that citizens simply do not trust the messenger.
Not surprisingly, the persuasiveness of any campaign may depend as
much on its source as on its content. Imagine, for example, Cheech
Marin trying to convince students not to use drugs, or one-time
General Motors' Hummer division trying to convince Americans that
global warming is a hoax. The government's ability to shape citizens'
preferences hinges in large part on lawmakers' credibility and
trustworthiness. 175 And as a general matter, the public does not trust
federal authorities very much, particularly compared to their state
counterparts. 176 When it comes to drug policy in particular, the public
seems to harbor doubts about the motive behind certain federal drug
policies. One common concern is that the federal marijuana ban is not
premised on science but is instead motivated by the financial interests
of large drug manufacturers, which could lose billions in drug sales if
an ordinary plant were to displace some of their patented medicines,
or so the story goes. 177 Whether such beliefs are correct is beside the
point; what matters is simply that as long as the federal government
suffers a trust deficit, it will have a difficult time nudging people's
beliefs in the direction federal lawmakers deem desirable.
State lawmakers, by contrast, arguably have more influence
over public beliefs and preferences. Owing to a variety of factors,
citizens on average deem state and local governments far more
trustworthy than the national government. 178 Consequently, state
lawmakers may have an advantage vis-d-vis their federal counterparts
when it comes to manipulating citizens' views of marijuana use or
175. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 171, at 17-18 ("The first requirement is that the person or
group of people who are endeavoring to affect another's preferences have some legitimate claim
to authority over the person, or at least have the confidence of the person. An untrusting and
defiant person is probably a poor candidate for preference modification."); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 952 (1996) ("Purely governmental efforts
at norm management may fail for lack of trust."); id. at 919 ("[A] serious problem with legal
efforts to inculcate social norms is that the source of the effort may be disqualifying. Such efforts
may be futile or even counterproductive. If Nancy Reagan tells teenagers to 'just say no' to drugs,
many teenagers may think that it is very good to say 'yes.' ").
176. See, e.g., John Kincaid & Richard L. Cole, Public Opinion on Issues of Federalism in
2007: A Bush Plus?, 38 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM 469, 477 (2008) (reporting survey data
showing that more than 44 percent of citizens had "Not very much" or "None at all" trust in the
federal government).
177. Cf. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 14, at 156 (claiming marijuana will never be
rescheduled by the federal government because no company would profit from it).
178. Mikos, Populist Safeguards, supra note 145, at 1699-1704.
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other behaviors. By legalizing medical use of marijuana, for example,
state laws may have softened public attitudes towards it. The use. of
marijuana may seem more efficacious and less dangerous or wicked
because it is permitted by state law. In addition, though states have
not waged a public relations campaign to match that of the ONDCP,
proponents of medical marijuana laws have run effective political
campaigns in getting such laws passed. Those campaigns have
generally portrayed medical marijuana in a very sympathetic light;
they have portrayed exemptions as rooted in compassion and hope for
the sick, rather than being about dangerous and reckless indulgences
for the wicked. 17 9
Federal drug authorities clearly appear troubled by the signal
they believe is being sent by state medical marijuana laws and the
political campaigns behind them. Indeed, their opposition to state
medical marijuana laws stems in large part from the widely shared
view that these state laws are, in fact, changing people's beliefs about
the dangers of marijuana use in particular, and perhaps drug use
more generally. General Barry McCaffrey, the former federal drug
czar, succinctly made the point to Congress: "Referenda that tell our
children that marijuana is a 'medicine' send them the wrong signal
about the dangers of illegal drugs-increasing the likelihood that more
80
children will turn to drugs."'
2. Moral Obligation to Obey Law
Some people refrain from behavior because they feel morally
obliged to obey a legal prohibition. In this sense, people are prone to
obey law not because they think it is in their self-interest (narrowly
defined) to do so, but because it is the right, the moral thing to do; it is
179. DEA Regulation of Medicine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Jud. Comm., 105th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Dr. David Murray,
Chief Scientist, Office of National Drug Control Policy), available at 2007 WL 2009613
(describing and critiquing the message being sent by proponents of medical marijuana laws).
180. Medical MarijuanaReferenda in America, supra note 56; see also "Medical"Marijuana,
Federal Drug Law and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, supra note 73, at 1-2 ("[State
initiatives that legalized marijuana for medical purposes] sent even more confusing and
contradictory messages to our already confused children at a time when their attitudes about
marijuana use may be open to bad influences and they may lead to even harder drugs.")
(statement of Rep. Mark Souder); id. at 44 ("[State laws] softeno the idea of the use of drugs ...
young people hear that and what they hear is that if it's a medicine it's not so bad. And then they
begin to use more.") (statement of Mel Semblar, former Chairman of the Drug Free America
Foundation); Brief of U.S. Reps. Mark E. Souder, et al., for Petitioners, at 28, Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) ("Repeated claims of marijuana's 'medicinal' value, coupled with the apparent
ratification of those claims by state medical marijuana laws, have lowered the public perception
of marijuana's scientifically demonstrated harmfulness-particularly among young people. ...
These public perceptions can have a significant impact on marijuana usage rates.").
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what people should do, even when they disagree with the law.18 1 In his
seminal work on obedience to law, Tom Tyler found that "[c]itizens
who view legal authority as legitimate are generally more likely to
comply with the law. ' 18 2 Tyler explains that "citizens may comply with
the law because they view the legal authority they are dealing with as
having a legitimate right to dictate their behavior; this represents an
acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into line with
18 3
the dictates of an external authority."
In theory, a lawmaker can draw upon its legitimacy to goad
compliance with laws the people (or some portion thereof) deem foolish
or unwise.18 4 To the extent Congress can oblige people into following
its marijuana ban, it may have more practical (de facto) authority
than the story sketched out in the previous Sections suggests, for it
would not need to hire more federal agents, build more federal
prisons, or buy more television ads to curb marijuana use. Indeed, as
noted earlier, some scholars have dismissed state medical marijuana
laws as ineffectual and largely symbolic measures because they
believe most people are unwilling, on moral grounds, to defy
185
Congress's ban.
Nonetheless, in spite of the generalized obligation to obey law
that many people feel, the obligation to obey the federal marijuana
ban is probably quite weak, for two main reasons. First, violations of
the ban are commonplace, thus undermining its moral influence.
When everyone knows a law is not being observed, the moral
obligation to obey that law dissolves and compliance suffers.18 6 As Dan
Kahan explains:

181. TYLER, supra note 173, at 24 ("The key feature of normative factors that differentiates
them from considerations of reward and punishment is that the citizen voluntarily complies with
rules rather than respond to the external situation. Because of this, normative influences are
often referred to by psychologists as 'internalized obligations,' that is, obligations for which the
citizen has taken personal responsibility."). Compliance with loosely enforced tax laws provides a
stunning example. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay between Norms and Enforcement
in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1453, 1459 (2003) (noting that "the expected sanction of any
particular tax evader is tiny, yet voluntary compliance with the federal income tax generally is
estimated to be around eighty-three percent").
182. TYLER, supra note 173, at 62.
183. Id. at 25.
184. Id. at 65 ("People clearly have a strong predisposition toward following the law. If
authorities can tap into such feelings, their decisions will be more widely followed.").
185. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 5, at 1544 (suggesting people won't use marijuana for
medical purposes, in part, because of the moral duty to obey law).
186. See Lederman, supra note 181, at 1461 (reviewing research showing that "people tend to
contribute to public goods when they perceive that others contribute, even though they would
maximize their own return by not contributing") (emphasis added).
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Most individuals regard compliance with law to be morally appropriate. But most also
loathe being taken advantage of. The latter sensibility can easily subvert the former if
individuals perceive that those around them are routinely violating a particular law.
submission to a burdensome legal duty is likely to
When others refuse to reciprocate,
18 7
feel more servile than moral.

Congress's ban may have lost its moral influence because so
many people flout it, and federal authorities have done little thus far
to punish them. In other words, the lack of enforcement of the federal
ban may have undermined not only the deterrent effect of the ban's
sanctions, but also the deterrent effect of the generalized moral
obligation to obey the law.
Second, people may feel relieved of the obligation to obey the
188 It is, of
federal ban because state law permits marijuana use.
course, possible to obey both state and federal law by not using
marijuana at all, but citizens may dismiss the obligation to obey
federal law when they deem the state-and not Congress-as having
the "legitimate right to dictate their behavior" regarding marijuana
use. 8 9 Congress's perceived right to dictate behavior may be even
weaker in the nine states where medical marijuana laws were passed
by voter referenda. In such states, people may see themselves
collectively as having the exclusive right to dictate marijuana policy,
in which case the federal ban will command very little moral
authority. 19 0
3. Social Norms (and Sanctions)
One final reason why people obey law has to do with social
norms. Social norms are non-legal rules and precepts (e.g., "don't
cheat on your spouse") that define what constitutes appropriate

187. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
358 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence]; see also Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action,
and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (2001) ("Individuals who have faith in the willingness of
others to contribute their fair share will voluntarily respond in kind.").
188. Despite the importance of the issue, there is little research directly on point. Tom Tyler
acknowledges that "[i]t is . . . unclear what the boundaries of legitimacy are. To which
authorities and to which of their actions is it granted?" TYLER, supra note 173, at 66. Cass
Sunstein briefly suggests that states may be best suited to change social norms because they are
"closest to the people, and in that sense most responsive to it." Supra note 175, at 952.
189. See Mikos, Populist Safeguards, supra note 145, at 1711-12 (discussing citizens'
federalism beliefs across various issue domains).
190. Surveys show that people consistently deem voter referenda more legitimate than laws
passed by their representatives (state or federal). See id. at 1708-11 (discussing literature).
Anecdotal evidence further suggests that citizens are particularly disdainful of legislative efforts
to repeal, amend, or otherwise tamper with measures enacted by voter referenda. Id. (discussing
Oregon voters' opposition to federal and state legislative efforts to repeal state's Death with
Dignity initiative).
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behavior and beliefs within a given community-a nation, state, city,
neighborhood, workplace, church, and so on. Such norms are backed
by a variety of non-legal sanctions (e.g., shame), giving these norms a
powerful influence over behavior that may rival that of law itself. 19 1
Like law, and in contrast to personal beliefs or the internalized moral
obligation to obey law, social norms exert external pressure on
individuals to conform. Unlike law, however, that external pressure is
applied by civil society rather than the government.
To the extent lawmakers can rely upon norms to discourage
behavior they deem undesirable, norms greatly reduce the need to
impose separate, costly legal sanctions. 192 On one view of the
legislative process, lawmakers can shape social norms by
manipulating whether society condemns or condones a given behavior,
similarly to the way they can shape personal beliefs about that
behavior. 193 Norms, of course, put added pressure on group members
to behave a particular way (in addition to the pressure exerted by
their own personal preferences). Indeed, because of this pressure to
conform, norms may influence the behavior even of those outlier
members who remain unconvinced by the government's message (i.e.,
members whose personal beliefs do not comport with the norm).
Because the means by which lawmakers shape norms are largely the
same as those by which they shape personal beliefs, 94 there is no need
to discuss them again here. Suffice to say, states again have the upper
hand in this regard. Just as they may be at an advantage when they
seek to manipulate personal beliefs due to their greater
trustworthiness, the states may be at an advantage vis-&-vis Congress
when manipulating social norms as well.
191. Richard McAdams discusses the conditions under which norms actually trigger
sanctions. He suggests there must be consensus as to whether some behavior is worthy of
esteem, that any such consensus must be widely known, and that violations of the consensus
(i.e., the norm) must be detectable. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997). For purposes of this article, I assume
that use of marijuana for medical purposes is detectable. This seems plausible, for 1) patients
need their doctors' recommendation to use the drug; and 2) oftentimes, patients have caregivers
(relatives or others) who directly witness use of the drug. It is possible, of course, that detection
of the medical use of marijuana is low, such that social norms would not significantly impact
marijuana use.
192. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1601 (2000); Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 187,
at 351; Sunstein, supranote 175, at 908.
193. Norms scholars often refer to this as managing the social meaning of behavior. For a
sampling of the literature suggesting law can change (alter, shape, and so on) the content of
norms, see, e.g.,

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,

ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE

DISPUTES (1991); TYLER, supra note 173; Cooter, supra note 192; Kahan, Social Influence, supra
note 187; Lessig, supra note 171; McAdams, supra note 191; Sunstein, supra note 175.
194. See supra Section B.1.
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On another view of the legislative process, norms are
entrenched; lawmakers must take norms as they find them, meaning
they cannot necessarily control whether society condemns or condones
any given behavior. This, in effect, makes norms a double-edged
sword. 195 Nonetheless, even if they cannot necessarily change the
content of norms, lawmakers can augment or diminish the influence of
a norm on behavior by educating citizens about the content and
potency of that norm.
The passage of a new law may help reduce citizens' uncertainty
about norms, particularly when they are in flux. The basic idea is that
citizens demand laws that comport with community norms, and
lawmakers, subject to constraints such as majority rule, respond by
supplying such laws. Hence, the passage of a law banning marijuana
use suggests the existence of a similar social norm condemning
marijuana use-i.e., it educates citizens about the content and potency
of community norms concerning marijuana.
In turn, clarifying the content and potency of normsparticularly new or evolving norms-can change people's behavior. To
illustrate, suppose X is considering smoking marijuana to treat his
glaucoma but is uncertain whether society now condemns use of
marijuana for such purposes. As Robert Scott explains in a different
example, the passage of a law regulating marijuana use provides X
Bayesian information concerning what his fellow citizens now think
about it.196 The law thus helps X more accurately determine the
expected social sanction, if any, for using marijuana. 197 For example,
the passage of a law proscribing marijuana signals society's
disapproval of it. It informs X that he should expect to incur a cost
apart from legal sanctions for smoking marijuana. On account of this
cost, X might refrain from using marijuana, despite the absence of

195. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1627-29 (2000) (criticizing the view the lawmakers actually spur creation of
new norms). Scott aptly states the two contrasting views of the relationship between law and
norms:
On one view, a norm already exists and the law simply reflects the emerging norm.
On the other view, the conditions for normative change are ripe, and the law
stimulates the creation of the new norm. Which came first, the chicken or the egg?
Without further, more rigorous analyses, the verdict on the expressive effects of law
must remain unproven. The ideas are interesting, the question is important, but, thus
far, the observations are largely speculative.

Id.
196. See id. at 1614-16 (suggesting law provides information about norms' content); see also
McAdams, supra note 191, at 400-07 (arguing that law publicizes social consensus and thereby
helps to create norms).
197. Scott, supranote 195, at 1616-17.

2009]

ON THE LIMITS OF SUPREMACY

1477

formal legal sanctions and even though X feels he might benefit from
marijuana use.
In the case of marijuana, of course, state and federal laws send
conflicting signals about the social acceptability of using the drug as
medicine. The CSA strongly suggests societal disapproval, but
permissive state laws suggest societal tolerance-and possibly even
approval-of medical use of the drug. If citizens take their cues from
federal law, Congress may have far more de facto impact on marijuana
use than previous Sections have suggested. Conversely, if citizens take
their cues from state law, Congress's influence in this domain is even
weaker than previously noted.
When it comes to educating citizens about norms, state laws
generally give citizens more current and relevant information, and as
a result are more likely to shape their choices than are federal laws.
For one thing, state laws typically convey more up-to-date information
about current social norms. The main reason is that states employ
comparatively majoritarian-friendly lawmaking processes, such as
referenda, that make updating state laws to keep up with changes in
societal views much easier. 198 To be sure, passage of a congressional
law regulating an activity signals something about how the nation
feels about that activity when the law is passed. Indeed, because it
takes super-majority support to push any measure through Congress,
laws that do emerge from the national process usually signal a strong
national consensus and norm. But because federal laws are so
resistant to change, the signal broadcast by the passage of federal law
fades quickly with time.
The CSA illustrates the point. The federal ban on medical use
of marijuana was adopted nearly forty years ago, when Congress
placed marijuana on Schedule I of the CSA. Whatever society's views
were circa 1970, they have since changed: the strict marijuana ban is
out of sync with current social norms. Society no longer condemns the
use of marijuana for medical purposes (assuming it ever did). On the
contrary, opinion polls consistently show more than 70 percent of the
American public now approves of the use of marijuana for medical
conditions. 199 But given the enormous challenge of changing any
congressional law, 200 the resilience of the now seemingly pass6 federal

198. See Mikos, Populist Safeguards, supra note 145, at 1687-91 (comparing responsiveness
of state and federal lawmaking procedures).
199. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
200. See generally Mikos, Populist Safeguards, supra note 145 (analyzing obstacles to
passage of congressional statutes).
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ban is hardly surprising. It would take an even more dramatic shift in
public opinion to formally undo it.
By contrast, state medical marijuana laws have all been
enacted more recently than the federal ban, starting with California in
1996 and continuing through Michigan in 2008. These state laws have
been supported by large and growing majorities. Support for the most
recently enacted measure-Michigan's Proposition 1-topped 63
percent. The passage of thirteen state laws, many by wide margins,
signals that society is more likely to support than to censure medical
use of marijuana. Thus, there is no social sanction for using marijuana
for medical purposes, or at least no consensus to condemn such
behavior, in these states.
In addition to being more current, state laws also convey more
accurate information about local norms. This is important because
norms held by local society exert far more influence on one's behavior
than do norms held by distant strangers. 2 1 After all, we interact
more-and care more about our standing-with neighbors, co-workers,
close family, and fellow worshipers than we do with people who live
far away. Thus, for example, the passage of California's
Compassionate Use Act in 1996 may have signaled the emergence of a
new, more permissive norm governing the medical use of marijuana in
that state. This event may have been enough to foster use of the drug
in California, even if drug norms elsewhere had not yet changed.
In short, even if they cannot shield people from federal legal
sanctions or change federal law in the short term, states can make
people feel secure from social sanctions by credibly signaling public
approval of once taboo conduct. 20 2 In this way, states wield another
powerful influence on private behavior, an influence that is not
necessarily subject to congressional preemption. 20 3 What is more, by
signaling societal approval of marijuana use, states may even
hamstring Congress's already limited ability to impose legal sanctions
on those who violate the federal ban. For example, jurors may be

201. See McAdams, supra note 191, at 387-88 (explaining why group norms have stronger
influence compared to larger societal norms).
202. In addition to broadcasting a more current and relevant signal concerning societal
approval/disapproval of medical use of marijuana, state laws arguably broadcast a clearer signal
as well. The reason is that state laws are more focused than the CSA; they address only the
medical use of marijuana, whereas the CSA addresses a host of topics, meaning the signal it
broadcasts on any one of them (e.g., should medical marijuana be legal) will be quite noisy.
203. In the lingo of the norms literature, states can play the role of norm critics or norm
entrepreneurs, facilitating changes to social norms; this role may be particularly important when
criticizing extant norms is costly. McAdams, supra note 191, at 396 (discussing norm critics and
how they often incur a cost when challenging conventional wisdom); Sunstein, supra note 175, at
929-30 (discussing role of norm entrepreneurs).
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unwilling to convict people who use marijuana for medical purposes
(or the people who help them) if they know that local society generally
approves of medical marijuana. 20 4 In fact, in order to avoid
sympathetic juries, the DEA has been attacking medical marijuana
suppliers primarily by using civil injunctions and civil sanctions such
as forfeiture, 20 5 which are tactics that do not require jury
participation.
Given the federal government's limited enforcement resources
and its comparatively weak influence over personal preferences, moral
obligations, and social norms, many citizens are not dissuaded from
using marijuana by the existence of the federal ban. States have
succeeded at removing--or at least diminishing-the biggest obstacles
curbing medical use of marijuana: state legal sanctions and the
personal, moral, and social disapproval that may once have inhibited
use of the drug. To be sure, they cannot eliminate all of the barriers to
medical use-those that exist in the state of nature (e.g., wealth
constraints) or those posed by federal sanctions-but they have gone
quite far, as participation rates in state programs demonstrate:
roughly 400,000 people may now be using marijuana legally for
medical purposes in thirteen states. 20 6 In short, though Congress's
categorical ban on marijuana is constitutional, state exemptions have
become the de facto governing law of the land.
V. CONCLUSION

Medical marijuana is but one example of a much broader
phenomenon: situations in which states legalize private activity that
Congress proscribes. Over the past few decades, the federal
204. Indeed, jurors in the federal prosecution of Ed Rosenthal (the so-called ganja guru)
claimed they would have acquitted him of marijuana charges had they known he was growing
marijuana for medicinal purposes. The problem, of course, is that jurors may not know they are
entitled to acquit the guilty, and courts may bar attorneys and witnesses from informing jurors
of the nullification power. United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting
that trial court correctly excluded evidence of medical marijuana defense that could be used only
to secure jury nullification).
205. See Klein, supra note 5, at 1564 n.117.
206. See supra note 153 (explaining estimate). The number of lawful medical users has
jumped over time, not only because more states have added exemptions but also because in-state
participation rates have climbed. In Oregon, for example, the number of registered users has
skyrocketed since the state's medical marijuana program was enacted in 1998; in 2002, for
example, only 1,691 people had registered for an exemption, but by 2008, more than 20,000
people were registered to use marijuana legally. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MARIJUANA:
EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH FOUR STATES' LAWS THAT ALLOW USE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES 28-29

(2002) (historical data); OREGON MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROGRAM, supra note 153 (current data).
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government has sought to ban a number of activities states have
legalized, including use of marijuana for medical purposes, certain
abortion procedures, physician-assisted suicide, needle exchange
programs, and possession of certain types of firearms, to name a
few. 20 7 In spite of its distinct character and prevalence, however, this
category of state/federal conflict-pitting permissive state laws
against restrictive federal ones-has largely escaped the attention of
legal scholars.
Using medical marijuana as a timely case study, this Article is
the first to analyze the legal status and practical significance of the
permissive state laws that form the heart of this distinct category of
conflict. To analyze the states' de jure authority, this Article develops
a new analytical framework for distinguishing between permissible
preemption and unconstitutional commandeering-the state-of-nature
benchmark. The state-of-nature benchmark explains why state laws
legalizing behavior Congress bans remain in force, even as state laws
banning behavior Congress legalizes do not. In the latter case, state
laws are preempted, barring contrary congressional intent, because
the threat of state sanctions would discourage the behavior Congress
has sought to foster or at least tolerate. The imposition of legal
sanctions constitutes a departure from the state of nature and thus an
action Congress may block. In the former case, however, state laws
survive because removing state sanctions does not encourage the
behavior Congress has sought to eliminate, at least in the legally
relevant sense-as measured against the behavior's prevalence in the
state of nature. The repeal of legal sanctions merely restores the state
of nature; the fact that it results in more violations of federal law does
not thereby make state permissiveness preemptable.
The state-of-nature benchmark introduced here provides a
useful heuristic for assessing whether Congress may preempt any
given state law. Consider, for example, recent proposals made by a few
states to legalize sports gambling. 20 8 The Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act of 1992 purports to preempt such proposals by
making it unlawful for states to "sponsor, operate, advertise, promote,
license, or authorize by law" sports gambling schemes not in existence
prior to the Act. 20 9 Much of the Act's language is unproblematic.

207. There is, in fact, a long history of this type of conflict (think of the personal liberty laws
passed by northern states before the Civil War). See supra note 107.
208. See, e.g., Letter from Sens. Orrin G. Hatch & Jon Kyl to Att'y Gen. Eric Holder (July 20,
2009), available at http://www.imega.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/O7hatch-kyl-letter2holder.pdf
(decrying proposals to permit sports gambling in Delaware and New Jersey).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2008).
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Operating a sports gambling scheme, 210 for example, constitutes a
clear departure from the state of nature and is thus subject to
congressional override. However, to the extent the Act seeks to
preempt state laws that merely authorize sports gambling, 211 it raises
serious constitutional questions. This language would seemingly bar
states from repealing existing prohibitions on sports gambling 2 12-i.e.,
it would force them to remain outside the state of nature, in violation
of the anti-commandeering rule.
The Article also explains why permissive state laws matter:
states are able to foster or at least enable federally proscribed
behavior, even when they cannot engage in, require, or facilitate it or
block federal authorities from imposing their own harsh sanctions on
it-i.e., even when states cannot depart from the state of nature. The
federal government does not have the law enforcement resources
needed to enforce its bans vigorously (although this could vary
somewhat by context 21 3), and its ability to marshal the most important
private and social behavioral influences to enhance compliance with
its bans is likewise limited. As a practical matter, by simply legalizing
a given behavior, the states can remove or at least diminish the most
significant barriers inhibiting that behavior, including state legal
sanctions (which often can be enforced vigorously) and the personal,
moral, and social disapproval of the behavior as well.
Though Congress has banned marijuana outright through
legislation that has survived constitutional scrutiny, state laws
legalizing medical use of marijuana not only remain in effect, they
now constitute the de facto governing law in thirteen states. These
state laws and most related regulations have not been-and, more
210. The Delaware statute contemplates a state-operatedsports lottery. 29 DEL. CODE ANN. §
4825 (2009) (instructing Director of State Lottery Office to "commence a sports lottery as soon as
practicable"). The Third Circuit has found the Delaware statute preempted by federal law. Office
of the Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
211. In contrast to the Delaware statute, the New Jersey proposal authorizes private casinos
to operate sports pools-i.e., it does not contemplate state operation of a sports gambling scheme.
N.J. Senate Bill No. 143 (2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/SO500/
143_I1.PDF. To be sure, private casinos are licensed by the state, but that alone does not make
them state actors. E.g., Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 189 (3d Cir. 2000).
212. The Delaware and New Jersey Constitutions ban, inter alia, sports-related gambling.
DEL. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.J. CONST. art. IV § 7.
213. Enforcing a (hypothetical) federal ban on physician-assisted suicide, for example, would
not require the same resource commitment from Congress as would enforcing the marijuana ban:
Only 341 residents have sought a physician's assistance to commit suicide since the inception of
Oregon's physician-assisted suicide program in 1997, a far cry from the 20,307 patients now
participating in Oregon's medical marijuana program. William Yardley, On Washington's State
Ballot: Doctor Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A12 (reporting data on Oregon
physician-assisted suicide program); OREGON MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROGRAM, supra note 153
(reporting data on Oregon medical marijuana program).
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interestingly, cannot be-preempted by Congress, given constraints
imposed on Congress's preemption power by the anti-commandeering
rule, properly understood. Just as importantly, these state laws
matter; state legalization of medical marijuana has not only
eliminated the most relevant legal barrier to using the drug, it has
arguably fostered more tolerant personal and social attitudes toward
the drug. In sum, medical marijuana use has survived and indeed
thrived in the shadow of the federal ban. The war over medical
marijuana may be largely over, though skirmishes will undoubtedly
continue, but contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the states, and not
the federal government, that have emerged the victors in this
struggle. Supremacy, in short, has its limits.

